Modeling and Detection of Meter Compromise Attacks against the Smart Grid Communication Infrastructure by unknown
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
© Abdurraoof Salih Al Amoudy 
2014 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For my mother, who offered me ultimate love and support through the course of this 
thesis 
 
 
 
 
 
  
iv 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
To ALLAH, all praises be to You, the most merciful and beneficent, who bestowed me with 
the knowledge, provided me the courage and endorsed me with the strength to achieve this 
research work.  At the completion of my thesis, I would like to share the credit with a few 
significant persons who have contributed to making this thesis possible. Firstly, I would 
like to express my sincerest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Sadiq, for his all-out support and 
assistance from the inception until the completion of my thesis work. I thank him for the 
time and effort he spent to guide me and for sharing his expertise in his scientific research 
field. In addition to my advisor, I would also like to commend my thesis committee 
members, namely Dr. Zubair Ahmed Baig and Dr. Talal Mousa Al-Kharobi, for their 
outstanding suggestions and valuable comments. Secondly, I am grateful to King Fahd 
University of Petroleum & Minerals for the support given to my research and for providing 
me with an advanced academic curriculum and a world-class research environment to 
keep me on track with my studies. Thirdly, I shall be eternally grateful to the Hadhramaut 
Establishment for Human Development, to whom I am indebted, for providing me the great 
opportunity to pursue my graduate studies.  Fourthly, I greatly appreciate the input of all 
of my friends, who supported me throughout, in particular, Mr. Saif Ahmad for his 
exceptional friendship and prompt feedback. Finally, I would like to take this opportunity 
to express my deepest appreciation to my beloved mother for her unconditional love and 
unlimited support all throughout my scholastic and career endeavors. 
 
v 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................. V 
TABLE OF CONTENTS......................................................................................................... VI 
LIST OF TABLES ........................................................................................................................ IX 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... X 
ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................................... XIII 
ARABIC ABSTRACT .............................................................................................................. XIV 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................. 1 
1.1 Traditional Grid ............................................................................................................................... 1 
1.1.1 How it works .............................................................................................................................. 1 
1.1.2 The Challenges ........................................................................................................................... 2 
1.2 Smart Grid....................................................................................................................................... 3 
1.3 The NIST Conceptual Model for the Smart Grid ............................................................................... 5 
1.3.1 Bulk Generation Domain ............................................................................................................ 6 
1.3.2 Distribution Domain ................................................................................................................... 7 
1.3.3 Customer Domain ....................................................................................................................... 7 
1.3.4 Operation Domain ...................................................................................................................... 8 
1.3.5 Markets Domain ......................................................................................................................... 9 
1.3.6 Service Provider Domain ............................................................................................................ 9 
1.3.7 Transmission Domain ............................................................................................................... 10 
1.4 Smart Grid Communication Infrastructure .................................................................................... 10 
1.4.1 Home Area Network (HAN) ...................................................................................................... 11 
vi 
 
1.4.2 Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) ......................................................................................... 12 
1.4.3 Wide Area Network (WAN) ...................................................................................................... 12 
1.5 Smart Grid Protocols ..................................................................................................................... 13 
1.6 Security of Smart Grid ................................................................................................................... 14 
1.6.1 Smart Grid Attacks ................................................................................................................... 15 
1.7 Problem Context ........................................................................................................................... 19 
1.8 Research Objectives ...................................................................................................................... 19 
1.9 Research Methodology ................................................................................................................. 20 
1.10 Research Contribution .............................................................................................................. 21 
1.11 Thesis Outline ........................................................................................................................... 21 
CHAPTER 2 SMART GRID ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES ............................. 23 
2.1 Requirements for Cyber Security of Smart Grid............................................................................. 26 
2.2 SCADA Security Concerns .............................................................................................................. 32 
2.2.1 Platform Vulnerabilities ........................................................................................................... 32 
2.2.2 Policy Vulnerabilities ................................................................................................................ 33 
2.2.3 Network Vulnerabilities............................................................................................................ 33 
2.3 Smart Meter Attacks and Countermeasures ................................................................................. 34 
2.3.1 Confidentiality .......................................................................................................................... 35 
2.3.2 Integrity.................................................................................................................................... 36 
2.3.3 Availability ............................................................................................................................... 37 
2.3.4 Non-repudiation ....................................................................................................................... 37 
2.4 Physical Layer Attacks and Countermeasures ............................................................................... 38 
2.4.1 Eavesdropping .......................................................................................................................... 40 
2.4.2 Jamming ................................................................................................................................... 41 
2.4.3 Injecting Request or Restrict Access ......................................................................................... 41 
vii 
 
2.4.4 Injection Attack ........................................................................................................................ 42 
2.5 Data Injection and Replay Attacks................................................................................................. 43 
2.6 Network-based Attacks ................................................................................................................. 45 
2.7 Summary....................................................................................................................................... 46 
CHAPTER 3 DETECTING SMART METER COMPROMISE ATTACKS THROUGH 
NEIGHBHOOD AREA METER CLUSTERING ..................................................................... 48 
3.1 Background ................................................................................................................................... 51 
3.1.1 Related Work ........................................................................................................................... 51 
3.1.2 AMI Review .............................................................................................................................. 53 
3.1.3 Energy Fraud Attack Tree ......................................................................................................... 55 
3.1.4 Notations ................................................................................................................................. 58 
3.2 The Attack Model .......................................................................................................................... 58 
3.3 Attack Detection Scheme .............................................................................................................. 63 
3.3.1 Assumption .............................................................................................................................. 63 
3.3.2 The Scheme .............................................................................................................................. 65 
CHAPTER 4 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ........................................................................... 70 
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK ........................................................... 84 
5.1 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 84 
5.2 Future Work .................................................................................................................................. 85 
REFERENCES............................................................................................................................. 86 
VITAE .......................................................................................................................................... 96 
 
  
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1: Main differences between the smart grid and traditional [3] ................................ 4 
Table 2: Actors and Applications for Each Domain in the Smart Grid .............................. 6 
Table 3: Smart Grid Communication Protocols................................................................ 13 
Table 4: A list of security benchmarks affected by the different Smart Grid attacks, and 
the location where such attacks take place ......................................................... 25 
Table 5: Notations of the scheme...................................................................................... 58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Traditional Power Grid Infrastructure ................................................................. 2 
Figure 2: The NIST Conceptual Model for the Smart Grid showing interaction between 
different domains through secure communication and electrical interfaces ........ 5 
Figure 3: Bulk Generation Domain..................................................................................... 7 
Figure 4: Distribution Domain ............................................................................................ 7 
Figure 5: Customer Domain................................................................................................ 8 
Figure 6: Operations Domain.............................................................................................. 8 
Figure 7: Markets Domain .................................................................................................. 9 
Figure 8: Service Provider Domain .................................................................................. 10 
Figure 9: Smart Grid Communication infrastructure ........................................................ 11 
Figure 10: DDoS Attack against the DCU [14] ................................................................ 17 
Figure 11: Remote Disconnect Command Attack [14] ..................................................... 18 
Figure 12: The five classes of the attacks that violate the Smart Grid infrastructure ....... 24 
Figure 13: The three major cyber-security requirements for the Smart Grid ................... 26 
Figure 14: Attacks with their possible location at smart grid architecture ....................... 31 
Figure 15: Cyber attacks that target the Smart Meter ....................................................... 35 
Figure 16: Assumed topology for the clustered advanced metering infrastructure (AMI)50 
Figure 17: Simple building blocks of AMI ....................................................................... 54 
x 
 
Figure 18: Attack tree for Energy Fraud ........................................................................... 57 
Figure 19: The attack model where the communication topology is centralized ............. 60 
Figure 20: A compromised smart meter sending correct readings to peer meters and 
incorrect readings to DCU ............................................................................... 61 
Figure 21: A compromised smart meter relay the same false readings to both its peer 
meters and the DCU ......................................................................................... 61 
Figure 22: Attack Detection Rate for Varying Cluster Size ............................................. 71 
Figure 23: False Negative Rate for Varying Cluster Size................................................. 72 
Figure 24: Communication Overhead Imposed by the Detection Scheme ....................... 73 
Figure 25: Attack Detection Rate for Varying Numbers of Compromised Nodes with 4 
Different Adversary Classes (N=1000) ............................................................ 74 
Figure 26: False Negative Rate for Varying Numbers of Compromised Nodes with 4 
Different Adversary Classes (N=1000) ............................................................ 75 
Figure 27: Attack Detection Rate for Varying Numbers of Nodes in a Cluster and 
Varying Attacker Ratios ................................................................................... 76 
Figure 28: False Negative Rate for Varying Numbers of Nodes in a Cluster and Varying 
Attacker Ratios ................................................................................................. 76 
Figure 29: Attack Detection Rate for four Packet drop rates and N=100 ......................... 78 
Figure 30: The False Rate for four Packet drop rates and N=100 .................................... 79 
xi 
 
Figure 31: Attack Detection Rate for four Packet drop rates and different Cluster Sizes 
and fixed number of compromised meter (r) =45 ............................................ 80 
Figure 32: Attack Detection Rate for four Packet drop rates and different Cluster Sizes 
and fixed number of compromised meter (r) =45 ............................................ 81 
Figure 33: Attack Detection Rate for fixed Packet drop rate (=25%) and Varying Cluster 
Sizes with different Attacker ratio ................................................................... 82 
Figure 34: False Alarm Rate for fixed Packet drop rate (=25%) and Varying Cluster Sizes 
with different Attacker ratio ............................................................................. 82 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
xii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Full Name : Abdurraoof Salih Al-Amoudy 
Thesis Title : Modeling and Detection of Meter Compromise Attacks Against the 
Smart Grid Communication Infrastructure 
Major Field : Computer Networks 
Date of Degree : October 2014 
 
The increasing demand for power has overwhelmed the current power grid. The Smart 
Grid uses a new paradigm to provide several distinctive functionalities to the consumers, 
in order to address the present problem of power demand. This newly developed power 
grid has an infrastructural design that is fully automated demanding little or no human 
intervention at all. This can be achieved by integrating the modern communications 
technologies into the electrical power grid. The information transmission related to billing, 
power consumption, and other important usage readings is achieved through installation 
of various sensors in the Smart Grid. However, this integration of technology also brings 
with it cyber security and privacy challenges. Several security, privacy and reliability 
issues arise during electric power delivery. The security challenges presented by the Smart 
Grid are unique and cannot be addressed through existing solutions. In this work, we 
present a categorization of the attacks that target Smart Grids based on the targeted victim 
or device, as well as on the type of the attack. We also propose a detection technique for 
meter compromise attacks against the Smart Grid Communications Infrastructure. 
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 ﺻﺎﻟﺢ اﻟﻌﻣودي فﻋﺑد اﻟرؤو :اﻻﺳم اﻟﻛﺎﻣل
 
ﻋن اﻟﮭﺟﻣﺎت اﻹﻟﻛﺗروﻧﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻲ ﺗﺗﻌرض ﻟﮭﺎ اﻟﻌدَادات اﻟذﻛﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺷﺑﻛﺎت اﻟﻛﮭرﺑﺎء  اﻟﻧﻣذﺟﺔ واﻟﻛﺷف :ﻋﻧوان اﻟرﺳﺎﻟﺔ
 اﻟذﻛﯾﺔ واﻟﺣدﯾﺛﺔ
 
  ﺣﺎﺳوباﻟﺷﺑﻛﺎت  اﻟﺗﺧﺻص:
 
  ـھ6341ﻣﺣّرم  :ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ اﻟدرﺟﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻣﯾﺔ
 
زاﯾد ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟطﺎﻗﺔ اﻟطﻠب اﻟﻣﺗوﻗﺗﻧﺎ اﻟﺣﺎﺿر أﺻﺑﺣت ﺷﺑﻛﺎت ﺗوﻟﯾد اﻟطﺎﻗﺔ اﻟﻛﮭرﺑﺎﺋﯾﺔ اﻟﺗﻘﻠﯾدﯾﺔ ﻏﯾر ﻗﺎدرة ﻋﻠﻰ ﺗﻠﺑﯾﺔ  ﻓﻲ
ﻠﻣﺳﺗﮭﻠﻛﯾن. ﻟﻋدة وظﺎﺋف ﻣﻣﯾزة اﻟﻛﮭرﺑﺎﺋﯾﺔ، وﻟﻣواﻛﺑﺔ ھذا اﻟطﻠب اﻟﻣﺗزاﯾد ﺗم إﻧﺷﺎء اﻟﺷﺑﻛﺔ اﻟﻛﮭرﺑﺎﺋﯾﺔ اﻟذﻛﯾﺔ واﻟﺗﻲ ﺗوﻓر 
ﻧظﻣﺔ اﻻﺗﺻﺎﻻت اﻟرﻗﻣﯾﺔ ﻛﺎﻟﻌدادات اﻟذﻛﯾﺔ وأ ﻣﯾﻣﮭﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺳﺗﺧدام أﺣدث ﺗﻘﻧﯾﺎتﺗﻌﺗﻣد اﻟﺷﺑﻛﺔ اﻟﻛﮭرﺑﺎﺋﯾﺔ اﻟذﻛﯾﺔ ﻓﻲ ﺗﺻ
اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎء ﻣﻦ ﺟﻤﻊ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻣﮭّﻤﺔ ﻣﻦ أﻣﺎﻛﻦ اﻻﺳﺘﮭﻼك واﻟﺘﻮﻟﯿﺪ واﻟﻨﻘﻞ ﻣﺜﻞ  ﻣﺆﺳﺴﺎتﺣﯿﺚ ﺗﻤّﻜﻦ ھﺬه اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ اﻟﻣراﻗﺑﺔ وﻏﯾرھﺎ. 
ھﺬا اﻷﺳﻠﻮب وﻜﺔ، اﻟﺸﺒﺔ ﻋﻦ أداء ﮭﻤ ّﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻣ ُ ﻟﻚاﻟﻄﺎﻗﺔ وﻛﺬ، وأﻧﻤﺎط اﻟﺘﻮﻟﯿﺪ ﻟﻤﺤﻄﺎت ﺪى اﻟﻤﺴﺘﮭﻠﻚاﺳﺘﮭﻼك اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎء ﻟ أﻧﻤﺎط
ﮭﺎ ﺗﺘﻤﺘﻊ ﺑ ﻛﻞ اﻟﻤﯿﺰات اﻟﺘﻲ ﻣﻊ ودﯾﻤﻮﻣﺔ ﺗﻮﻟﯿﺪ وﻧﻘﻞ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎء. ووﺛﻮﻗﯿﮫﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺔ ﺗﺤﺴﯿﻦ ﻛﻔﺎءة  أﺗﻤﺘﮫإدارة اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ ﻣﺎ ھﻮ إﻻ ﻓﻲ  اﻟﺠﺪﯾﺪ
ﮭﺠﻤﺎت ﻟاﻟﺤﺪﯾﺜﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ ﻟﻈﮭﻮر اﻟﻌﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﻦ ا ﺼﻌﻮﺑﺎت، ﻓﻠﻘﺪ أدى دﻣﺞ اﻟﺘﻘﻨﯿﺔﺗﻮاﺟﮫ اﻟﻜﺜﯿﺮ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺘﺤﺪﯾﺎت واﻟ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ اﻟﺬﻛﯿﺔ إﻻ إﻧﮭﺎ
 ﺗﻮﺻﯿﻞﺛﻨﺎء أﻗﺪ ﺗﻈﮭﺮ  اﻟﺘﻲ اﻟﺨﺼﻮﺻﯿﺔ واﻟﻤﻮﺛﻮﻗﯿﺔﻗﻀﺎﯾﺎ اﻟﻌﺪﯾﺪ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻘﻀﺎﯾﺎ اﻷﻣﻨﯿﺔ واﻹﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﯿﺔ ﻻﻧﺘﮭﺎك أﻣﻦ اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ، ﻓﮭﻨﺎﻟﻚ 
ﻓﻲ ھﺬا اﻟﺒﺤﺚ رﻛﺰﻧﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ أﺣﺪ أﻧﻮاع ھﺬه اﻟﮭﺠﻤﺎت، واﻟﺬي ﯾﺴﺘﮭﺪف اﻟﻌﺪادات اﻟﺬﻛﯿﺔ ﺑﮭﺪف اﻟﺘﻼﻋﺐ ﺑﻘﺮاءة اﻟﻌﺪاد أﻣﺎ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎء. 
، ﻟﻘﺪ ﻗﻤﻨﺎ أوﻻ ًﺑﺘﺼﻨﯿﻒ اﻟﮭﺠﻤﺎت اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺴﺘﮭﺪف اﻟﺸﺒﻜﺔ اﻟﺬﻛﯿﺔ ﺑﻨﺎًء ﻋﻠﻰ اﻟﺨﺪﻣﺔ اﻟﻜﮭﺮﺑﺎﺋﻲ اﻻﺳﺘﮭﻼكﺑﺰﯾﺎدة أو ﻧﻘﺼﺎن 
  اﻟﻤﺴﺘﮭﺪﻓﺔ أو اﻟﺠﮭﺎز أو ﻧﻮع اﻟﮭﺠﻮم. ﻛﻤﺎ ﻗﻤﻨﺎ ﻓﻲ ھﺬه اﻟﺪراﺳﺔ ﺑﺎﻗﺘﺮاح ﺗﻘﻨﯿﺔ ﻟﻠﻜﺸﻒ ﻋﻦ اﻟﮭﺠﻤﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺘﻌﺮض ﻟﮭﺎ اﻟﻌﺪادات اﻟﺬﻛﯿﺔ.
 
 
 ﻣﻠﺨﺺ اﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ
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1 CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Traditional Grid 
The traditional power grid is the infrastructure that carries electricity from power plants 
(coal plants, hydroelectric dams, etc.) to a large number of users or customers (household, 
businesses, and industries) where it is consumed. The most apparent components of the 
traditional grid for many of us are the towering high-voltage transmission lines that 
crisscross the countryside or the neighborhood substations that distribute power locally [1]. 
1.1.1 How it works 
Basically, the traditional electricity grid was designed to supply consumers with electricity 
from where it is generated. It uses a centralized model wherein consumers use electricity 
that comes from fixed plants through an old, unidirectional communication and circulation 
system. 
The traditional electricity grid shown in Fig. 1. It is transmission system uses high voltage 
cables to transport electricity over long distances while a medium voltage wires and 
substations are used in its distribution system for distributing the power locally. Step-up 
transformers are utilized to raise the electricity during the transmission to sub-stations over 
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long distance; however, pole-top transformers are used to scale down the voltage when the 
electricity is transmitted to consumers’ locations through medium voltage lines [1]. 
 
Figure 1: Traditional Power Grid Infrastructure 
 
1.1.2 The Challenges 
With the advancement of technology, the traditional power grid has failed to consider that 
the demand for power keeps increasing exponentially. The absence of communication in 
the current power grid makes the system simply a generator of power without any regard 
to the electricity required by consumers. Therefore, a bidirectional communication channel 
must be created between the electricity utility and consumer in order to regulate the amount 
of electricity supplied and to make sure that the consumers get only the required power. In 
addition, two-way communication allows electricity providers to attain three main 
objectives, namely security, intelligent observing, and load balancing [2]. 
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1.2 Smart Grid 
Smart Electrical Grid, also known as smart grid (SG), intergrid, intelligent grid, intelligrid, 
intragrid, or future grid has become one of the fastest growing areas in the information 
technology industry [3]. It was initiated with the idea of advanced metering infrastructure 
(AMI) to meet the global demand for electricity and to improve energy efficiency, and the 
construction of reliable self-healing grid protection against natural catastrophes and 
malicious disruption. With the birth of Smart Grid, new requirements and demands have 
driven the electricity industries, so research organizations and government agencies are 
considering to further study and expansion of the initially perceived scope of the Smart 
Grid. Due to a two-way process of communication, self-monitoring, self-healing, 
utilization of modern information technologies, and other salient features promised by the 
Smart Grid, it has gained the interest of many customers as a way of addressing the present 
problems of the traditional grid to meet increasing power demand. 
The term Smart Grid SG as defined by the European Technology Platform Smart Grid 
ETPSG [4] is “An electricity network that can intelligently integrate the actions of all users 
connected to it – generators, consumers and those that do both – in order to efficiently 
deliver sustainable, economic and secure electricity supplies”. By integrating the latest 
information and advanced digital communication technologies, the smart grid is capable of 
generating electrical power in ways that are more efficient and of dropping peak energy 
demand. 
Smart Grid can be viewed from two different ways: one is from the energy transmission 
viewpoint and the second is from the information transmission viewpoint. In the first, the 
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Smart Grid is viewed as a traditional grid delivering electricity from power plants to 
consumers.  In the second, the smart grid is viewed as a sensor network: as a sensor it 
integrates important sensing capabilities, which can in effect imitate various wireless 
sensors network (WSN) features. For example, data collection can be distributed in a large 
scale networking environment through an accurate and robust sensing infrastructure (e.g., 
advanced metering infrastructures). According to a study by the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) [3], the expected advantages and features of this modern 
grid are as follow: 
1. Enhancing, power quality and reliability. 
2. Improving capacity and efficiency of the existing grid. 
3. Improving resilience to disruption. 
4. Reducing the dependence on fossil fuels by means of the integration of renewable 
energy sources. 
5. Automating maintenance and operations. 
Table 1 shows the main differences between the two grids [3]. 
Table 1: Main differences between the smart grid and traditional [3] 
  Traditional Grid Smart Grid 
Electromechanical Digital 
One-way communication Two-way communication 
Centralized generation Distributed generation 
Few sensors Sensors throughout 
Manual monitoring Self-monitoring 
Manual restoration Self-healing 
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Failures and blackouts Adaptive and islanding 
Limited control Pervasive control 
Few customer choices Many customer choices 
 
1.3 The NIST Conceptual Model for the Smart Grid 
Furthermore, to fully understand this new paradigm, the conceptual model (see Fig. 2) 
provided by NIST can be used as a reference for different parts of the smart grid electrical 
system. In this model, it is seen that there are seven domains in the smart grid. Each domain 
is comprised of a number of actors and applications, as shown in Table 2. The actors are 
typically devices, systems, or programs that make decisions and exchange information 
through a range of interfaces in order to accomplish applications and processes. The 
applications are several tasks performed by an actor or actors within a certain domain [3]. 
In the following paragraphs, domains and actors are briefly described. 
 
Figure 2: The NIST Conceptual Model for the Smart Grid showing interaction between different domains 
through secure communication and electrical interfaces 
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Table 2: Actors and Applications for Each Domain in the Smart Grid 
DOMAINS ACTORS APPLICATIONS 
Bulk Generation 
Generators of electricity 
power in huge quantities. 
Power generation, asset 
management, etc.   
Transmission 
Transmission lines of 
electricity power over long 
distances 
Monitoring and control 
systems, stabilize and 
optimize, etc. 
Distribution  
Distributors of electricity 
to and from customers 
Substations automation, 
control, records, assets, 
management, etc. 
Customer End users of electricity 
Building/home automation, 
solar/wind generation, etc.  
Markets 
Operators and participants 
in electricity markets 
Market management, 
retailing, trading, etc.  
Operations 
Managers of the movement 
of electricity 
Network operations, 
monitor control, analysis, 
customer support, etc. 
Service Provider 
Organizations providing 
service to electrical 
customers and utilities 
Customer management, 
installation and 
maintenance, billing, home 
management, etc.  
 
1.3.1 Bulk Generation Domain 
This domain takes charge of producing huge amounts of electricity by both renewable and 
non-renewable power sources. There are two kinds of renewable sources: the variable 
sources which include wind and solar, and the non-variable sources which include biomass, 
geothermal, hydro and pump storage. On the other hand, the non-renewable energy sources 
include coal, nuclear, and gas. Stored energy for later distribution may be used in these 
domains [5]. The resources used by the bulk generation domain are shown in Fig. 3. 
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 Figure 3: Bulk Generation Domain 
1.3.2 Distribution Domain 
This domain (see Fig. 4) administers several functions. Firstly, it allocates electricity (both 
sent and received) to the customers. Secondly, it connects all the devices and smart in the 
grid network. Thirdly, it administers grid’s devices via wireless/wire-line communication. 
Lastly, it is very possible that the distribution network may be connected to energy storage 
facilities and alternative distributed energy resources at the distribution level [5].  
 
 
Figure 4: Distribution Domain 
1.3.3 Customer Domain 
This domain takes charge of connecting the grid’s end users such as household, 
commercial, and industrial buildings to the power distribution network via the smart meters 
[5]. These smart meters monitor the flow of electricity consumed by the customers and 
provide statistics of usage. In addition, this domain also manages the connectivity with 
plug-in vehicles (PEVs). Fig. 5 summarizes the main functions handled by this domain. 
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 Figure 5: Customer Domain 
1.3.4 Operation Domain 
The Operations domain mainly takes charge of managing and controlling the electricity 
flow of all other domains [5]. This domain undertakes supervisory tasks like monitoring, 
reporting, controlling and processing of other relevant information. Fig. 6 illustrates the 
flow of electricity from all other domains into the Smart Grid.  
 
Figure 6: Operations Domain 
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1.3.5 Markets Domain 
The Markets domain takes charge of the coordination and operations of all involved parties 
in the Smart Grid [5]. In effect, trading of energy services, wholesaling, retailing, market 
organization, and information exchange with other parties are handled by this domain. Fig. 
7 shows all main functions performed by this domain.  
 
Figure 7: Markets Domain 
 
 
1.3.6 Service Provider Domain 
The Service Provider domain takes charge of the operations related to the third-party such 
as information of energy management (see Fig. 8). Additional tasks like demand response 
programs, outage management and field services may be handled by this domain [5]. 
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 Figure 8: Service Provider Domain 
1.3.7 Transmission Domain 
This domain mainly takes charge of transferring the electrical power from generation 
sources to distribution through several substations. It is electrically connected to both the 
Bulk Generation and Distribution domains; it also communicates with the Operation, and 
Markets domains. Maintaining stability of the electric grid by balancing generation 
(supply) with load (demand) across the transmission network is a primary responsibility of 
the Regional Transmission Operator or Independent System Operator (RTO/ISO), which 
typically operate the Transmission domain [5]. 
1.4 Smart Grid Communication Infrastructure 
Communication is the essential part of the smart grid infrastructure (SGI). It takes charge 
of the connectivity and information transmission of devices throughout among the entire 
system. [3]. This section will provide an overview of the smart communication layers. The 
home area networks (HAN), the neighborhood area networks (NAN), and the wide area 
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networks (WAN) are the three well-known layers of the smart grid infrastructure. Each 
layer has its own composition of different modules or controlling systems to cater for any 
provision to expand in the future (see Fig. 9). 
 
Figure 9: Smart Grid Communication infrastructure 
1.4.1 Home Area Network (HAN) 
This layer is especially responsible for the setting up of communication between devices 
at household while its gateway is serving as interface for communication with the 
neighborhood area network (NAN). It mainly provides facilities for controlling and 
monitoring at customers’ houses and implements sophisticated functionalities. The meter 
controlling system (MCS), metering module (MM), and Service module (SM) are features 
of the HAN. Each has its own specific functions: the SM takes charge of providing real-
time energy consumption and tariff data to the consumers; the MM takes charge of storing 
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information about the energy consumption of the consumers; and the MCS takes charge of 
accumulating and controlling the information exchanged from SM and MM [6].  
1.4.2 Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) 
It is the second layer of the grid communication infrastructure is comprised of multiple 
interconnected MCSs of HAN which are located very close to each other. NAN also 
contains the smart meter data collector (SMDC) and the central access controller (CAC). 
All the metering archives are handled by SMDC while the CAC responsible for 
administering the communication between the HANs and energy provider. As thousands 
of houses needs to be covered by the network, supporting mesh networking, mostly 
covering square miles, is one of the main functions of NAN. With put into account that low 
latencies, typically 10 seconds or less were provided by these networks, because monitor 
signals are part of the bidirectional communication [6]. 
1.4.3 Wide Area Network (WAN) 
This layer (WAN) is the last layer of the communication infrastructure in smart grid 
system. This layer takes charge of providing communication between highly scattered and 
smaller area networks which serve the power systems at different places. The WAN has 
three main components: firstly, the energy distribution system (EDS) specifically takes 
charge of the distribution of energy and metering data; secondly, the supervisory control 
and data acquisition (SCADA) controller manages the distribution of the grid elements; 
and thirdly the energy and service corporations (E&SC). The accumulated information 
from the two components EDS (metering) and SCADA controller (control) is transmitted 
to E&SC for making advance decisions on price [6].  
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1.5 Smart Grid Protocols  
The advent of Smart Grid, which hopes to address several issues regarding the existing 
power grid, has urged researchers to conduct further studies in the design and development 
of an efficient infrastructure for connecting different components of SG. Furthermore, new 
wired/wireless approaches are ready for deployment to different components/applications 
of the SG to advance the currently used underlying networks and protocols [7]. In order to 
address these new challenges, the researchers will employ survey methods focusing on the 
routing issues in the Smart Grid communications infrastructure consist of three major 
components, (HANs), (NANs) and (WANs). The communication infrastructure in Smart 
Grid must support the anticipated smart grid services and meet the performance 
requirements. As the infrastructure connects a huge number of electric devices and 
administers the intricate device communications, it is created in a hierarchical architecture 
with interconnected discrete subnetworks, each taking responsibility for distinct 
geographical regions [8]. Table 3 summarizes the communication protocols that are used 
in Smart Grid communication architecture [9] [10]. 
Table 3: Smart Grid Communication Protocols 
 ZigBee Z-Wave HomePlug Ethernet WiMAX Wi-Fi 
Connectivity  Wireless  Wireless Wired  Wired  Wireless Wireless 
Max speed 
per channel 
250 kbps (2.4 GH) 
40 kbps (915 
MHZ) 
40 kbps 14-200Mbps 10-1000Mbps 280Mbps 11-300Mbps 
Standards  
‐IEEE 802.15.4  
‐Proprietary(L3‐
L7) 
Proprietary (Zens
ys ) 
IEEE P1901 
Specifications: 
HomePlug 1.0 
HomePlug AV, HomePlug C 
C 
I EEE 802.3 
IEEE 
802.16 
IEEE 
802.16e 
IEEE 802.11 
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Reach  
10 ‐75 m  
(30 m typical) 
30 m open‐
air, reduced in‐door 300m 100m (Twisted‐Pair Cable) 30 miles 100m (Indoors) 
Layer HAN HAN HAN NAN WAN NAN 
 
1.6 Security of Smart Grid 
Security is an infinite game of wits, between asset owners and attackers. SGI security is 
not exempt in this. Security is considered one of the greatest challenges that hinder the 
growth of the Smart Grid [3]. The “two-way communication” between millions of devices 
within Smart Grid, a key characteristic of Smart Grid, generates a more reliable and robust 
electrical system. However, these benefits gained by using the Smart Grid come with major 
issues associated with securing the infrastructure of Smart Grid. Therefore, controlling the 
entire grid by advanced computers and other smart digital devices, which can affect the 
reliability of the Grid system, means that the integrity of both the transmitted data and the 
infrastructure must be well protected [11]. A study reports that two cyber adversaries from 
China and Russia have obtained access to the United States power grid and may have even 
implanted Malware into the grid system to cause a future power failure [12]. 
Equipping the Smart Grid with excellent resources while providing it with ineffective 
security gives an opportunity to an adversary with malice in mind to even take control of a 
section of the Smart Grid by violating the communication infrastructure, causing an 
extensive outage. Since the Smart Grid comprises many interrelated devices, this would in 
turn lead to power failure and monitoring problems through a major zone of the grid [12]. 
To fully achieve energy administration and service control, smart meter devices will also 
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be integrated into water and gas grids. Such an integration will add further complexity to 
the Smart Grid Infrastructure (SGI) [11].  The Smart Grid is envisioned to alleviate the 
functionalities of power devices and also modularize expendability and maintenance 
related issues. It will be composed of non-proprietary products that may utilize open source 
communication technologies like IP which have in the past proven to be fallible and have 
non-deterministic behaviors [13]. 
1.6.1 Smart Grid Attacks 
Smart Grid security must treat not only security breaches of the grid system caused by user 
errors, device failures, and natural catastrophes, but also deliberate cyber-attacks, such as 
from insider malcontents, terrorists, and industrial hackers [3]. Research shows that there 
were several attacks targeting the Smart Grid. This section explains and discusses briefly 
these attacks on the Smart Grid. 
 Eavesdropping: As a wireless signal propagates over open space, any unauthorized 
node is capable of capturing the data transmitted and access confidential information. 
This kind of attack has the following properties: 
1. This attack can be quickly initiated, as low cost and off-the-shelf hardware 
components are easily available. 
2. Not easy to detect this attack as the attacker does not expose their activity. Such an 
attack can be mitigated by applying advanced cryptography, in which the 
unauthorized node can’t understand the data [14].  
 Jamming: The primary aim of this attack is to deteriorate availability by filling the 
wireless medium with noise signals. There are two types of this kind of attack, (1) 
Proactive jamming: in this attack, the wireless channel is completely blocked by 
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continuously giving out noise signals. (2) Reactive jamming: this kind of attack only 
launches when sensing signals on communication channel. The legal node could suffer 
from this attack in two ways: first, the channel will always be busy for any channel 
sensing performed by this node; second, the node may fail of receiving packets. 
Furthermore, it is not easy to detect a reactive jammer as it is very difficult to know 
whether the packet loss results from attacks or normal collisions [15]. 
 Consumer Device Implant: In this attack, the adversary tries to implant a bogus 
device into the system of the Smart Grid to act as a legal consumer device. The 
motivation behind this is to tamper with the electricity readings of the consumer device. 
Both the consumers and the electricity utility will be affected by this attack [16]. 
 Meter Implant: A fake meter (or legal meter that runs malicious software) can be 
planted in the Smart Grid system with the main goal of to disrupting the routine 
functionalities of the Smart Grid, or to compromise the electricity company's image. In 
this attack, the amount of the electricity usage bill of a given consumer can be 
increased/decreased [16]. 
 Black Hole: A Data Collection Unit (DCU) for an SGI may act in an inappropriate 
manner due to malicious software installation. In this case this DCU can be considered 
as a Black Hole in the SGI communication network. The Black Hole attack is used to 
prevent many meters from sending their reading to the control center services (CCS) 
through the DCU. This attack can disrupt the entire operation of the Smart Grid for a 
given neighborhood area network (NAN) where this fake DCU exists [16]. 
 Hand-held Terminal Exploitation: Hand-held terminals are used by Smart Grid 
technicians for the purpose of maintenance or software installation. The internet 
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connectivity and USB port interface make these terminals exposed to compromise 
either by a worm or malware, considering that any hacking of these terminals may 
cause disruptions to SGI operations. The motivation of such an attack is to damage the 
SGI instruments, such as smart meters and the DCU and this may cause severance to 
the Smart Grid operation as well as consumer frustration [16].  
 DDoS attack against Data Concentrator Unit (DCU): The reason of such an attack 
is to violate the DCU and disrupt communication between NAN and WAN networks. 
Assuming the entry point of this attack is the smart meter, typical attack steps that 
would be required are (1) install malicious software on meters through physical 
manipulation or exploitation of weak points in network, (2) coordination of DoS 
campaign, and sending malicious packets to (DCU). Fig. 10 illustrates this attack and 
all the steps in which such an attack can be launched [15]. 
 
Figure 10: DDoS Attack against the DCU [14] 
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 Stealing Customer Information: The motivations identified for this attack include the 
collection of customer information to learn about customer behavior. This attack can 
be launched through the meter, by snooping on the incoming and outgoing network 
traffic of the meter. This attack may call for the following individual steps: (1) stealing 
decryption keys by physically accessing the meter or executing brute-force attack on 
the cryptosystem, (2) spying on the AMI traffic, and (3) decryption of the messages 
and collection of the message content [14].  
 Sending Remote Disconnect Commands through the DCU: The main goal of 
launching this attack is to disconnect a large number of customers’ meters (see Fig. 
11). The DCU is very likely to be the point for launches such an attack. The attack steps 
involved are: (1) installing malicious software on the DCU through physical 
manipulation or exploitation of vulnerability; (2) collecting information about target 
smart meter (e.g., IP address); and (3) conveying remote disconnect command [14]. 
 
Figure 11: Remote Disconnect Command Attack [14] 
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 1.7 Problem Context 
This research mainly focuses on the detection of smart meter compromise attacks that 
disturb the Smart Grid communication infrastructure. As the Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI) of the Smart Grid comprises a multiple of interconnected Smart Grid 
devices that form a mesh, traditional intrusion detection systems are no longer sufficient 
and effective for the AMI. Therefore, relaying on a single front-end intrusion detection 
system to check the incoming and outgoing network traffic to identify intruders for an 
entire neighborhood area network (NAN), may not be suitable for an AMI. Moreover, 
millions of smart meters were deployed by some utility providers at their service regions, 
thus affecting the scalability of distributed sensor-based intrusion detection schemes. In 
this regard, we need to develop a mechanism to perform localized intrusion detection 
within clusters of smart meters with low data processing overheads. 
1.8 Research Objectives 
The ultimate objective of this research is to model and analyze Meter Compromise attacks 
in the Smart Grid Communications Infrastructure (SGI), and present new countermeasures 
and mitigation techniques against these. A classification of smart grid attacks and 
countermeasures will also be studied to benefit the Smart Grid research community. We 
shall work towards a formulation of various attack scenarios based on system and network 
parameters. The primary objectives of the thesis work can be summarized through the 
following points: 
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1. Explore Smart Grid cyber attacks and their effect on the grid. 
2. A taxonomy of attacks on the Smart Grid together with an analysis of various 
countermeasures. 
3. Model and analyze Meter Compromise attacks on the Smart Grid and present 
countermeasures. 
4. The proposal of a scheme based on clustering of smart meters within a NAN that 
supports a timely exchange of readings between peer-meters of a cluster. 
5. Performance evaluation of the proposed scheme through simulation under varying 
network and system parameters. 
1.9 Research Methodology 
To achieve the above mentioned research objectives, We will follow an approach that 
combines theoretical, developmental, as well as experimental aspects. The research will be 
initiated with an extensive literature review that covers most of SG aspects and different 
types of cyber-attacks violating Smart Grid communication infrastructure. The information 
gained in this step will smooth the path to build the experimentation models needed in this 
research. A proposal of novel meter compromise attack mitigation techniques will be the 
key phase to design experimentation. Simulation of real-life scenarios is essential to gain 
deeper understanding of meter compromise attacks and how to counter such attacks and 
reduce their impact on SGI. Documentation is an integral part of this research and will be 
conducted in parallel with each phase. This will also satisfy the goal of the researchers to 
publish results in reputable journals and conferences.  
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1.10 Research Contribution 
Despite the Smart Grid’s great benefits, its security is still in its early stages. With security 
being one of the top challenges that hamper the widespread acceptance of SG technology, 
it has become a major field of study. The existing security frameworks and traditional 
intrusion detection systems do not adapt well to the Advanced Metering Infrastructure 
(AMI). Instead of having a single front-end intrusion detection system for an entire 
neighborhood area network, we propose a distributed information sharing mechanism to 
perform localized intrusion detection within clusters of smart meters. The scheme 
effectively reduces the data processing overhead imposed on centralized intrusion 
detection systems operated in the utility providers’ servers positioned in the AMI’s 
demilitarized zone. It operates through collaborative information sharing between smart 
meters of a given neighborhood or cluster. Information exchange between smart meters is 
done at fixed intervals of time, assuming loose time synchronization. The exchange of local 
electricity usage readings between peer meters leverages localized intelligence on observed 
network traffic by the meters to the DCU, and provides for a holistic visualization of 
network traffic activity. Meter-to-meter communication topology was implemented, and 
its effect on the intrusion detection scheme’s performance was studied. 
1.11 Thesis Outline 
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2, we provide a taxonomy of 
different kinds of Smart Grid cyber attacks with a mitigation analysis. Specifically, we 
group these attacks according to their targeted services or devices, as well as on the type 
of the attack. Five groups of smart grid cyber attacks will be highlighted, namely Physical 
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layer attacks, SCADA attacks, Smart Meter attacks, Replay attacks and Data injection, and 
Network-based attacks. 
In Chapter 3, we present a distributed information sharing mechanism to perform localized 
intrusion detection within clusters of smart meters. This scheme identifies smart meter 
compromise attacks through collaborative information sharing. The technique is novel, as 
smart meters within communication range of each other are clustered together for 
information sharing and collaborative attack detection.  In Chapter 4, we present the 
Performance Analysis of the Proposed Algorithms through a discrete event simulation of 
varying neighborhood area networks of an AMI. The study is concluded and the direction 
of its future work is proposed in Chapter 5.  
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2 CHAPTER 2 
SMART GRID ATTACKS AND COUNTERMEASURES 
The birth of Smart Grids (SGs) that zero in to a timely, efficient and effective (meaning 
uninterrupted) power supply to consumers makes their platform essential in today's world. 
As well as this, while consumers enjoy optimizing their electricity usage, they also enjoy 
receiving accurate and constant feedback on their electricity usage from the smart meters 
through support from the underlying smart infrastructure (i.e. various devices that comprise 
a Smart Grid). However, this integration of modern technologies into the Smart Grid 
infrastructure also brings cyber security and privacy challenges. Many security, privacy 
and reliability issues appear during electric power delivery. 
As many of the Smart Grid’s functions, like control and monitoring, are heavily reliant on 
the use of a modern communication technologies, the security of the grid infrastructure 
against the cyber/physical attacks is significant. Smart Grid (SG) is not exempt from being 
exploited; it is therefore vulnerable to malicious attacks. 
With security being one of the top challenges that hampers Smart Grid, it has become a 
major field of study. Many attacks of different classes may be committed against the entire 
Smart Grid system or may be against particular components or devices therein. A proper 
identification and detection of such attacks represents the first procedure towards defense 
and protection. Throughout this chapter, we attempt to provide a taxonomy of different 
kinds of Smart Grid cyber attacks that attack the Smart Grid system. We will also present 
number of countermeasures. We classify these attacks according to their targeted services 
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or devices, as well as on the type of the attack. Five groups of Smart Grid cyber attacks 
and the countermeasures that will be highlighted and fully discussed in this chapter: 
1. SCADA attacks, 
2. Smart Meter attacks, 
3. Physical Layer attacks, 
4. Data injection and Replay attacks, and 
5. Network-based attacks. 
Fig. 12 illustrates the five classes of the cyber attacks that violate the Smart Grid 
infrastructure. 
 
Figure 12: The five classes of the attacks that violate the Smart Grid infrastructure 
A summary of security benchmarks affected by the different Smart Grid attacks, and the 
place where such attacks take place, is explained in Table 4. 
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Table 4: A list of security benchmarks affected by the different Smart Grid attacks, and the location where such 
attacks take place 
Attack Type 
Affected Security 
Property 
Victim Location 
SCADA 
DoS, Confidentiality, and 
Integrity 
Home Area Networks 
Smart Meter 
Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability, Non-
Repudiation 
HAN / NAN 
Physical Layer 
Confidentiality, Data 
Integrity, and DoS 
HAN / NAN / WAN 
Data Injection and Replay  
Confidentiality and 
Integrity 
Home Area/Neighborhood 
Area/ Wide Area Networks 
Network-based   
Availability, 
Confidentiality 
Home Area/Neighborhood 
Area/ Wide Area Networks 
 
In Section 2.1, a summary of cyber attacks requirements for the Smart Grid is illustrated. 
Several kinds of SCADA security threats and the proposed mitigation techniques are 
discussed in Section 2.2. Smart meter-specific attacks and countermeasures are explained 
in detail in Section 2.3. An in-depth analysis of physical layer attacks that violate the Smart 
Grid system is thoroughly discussed in Section 2.4. Several data injection and replay 
attacks are examined in Section 2.5. Lastly, network-based attacks are analyzed and 
reported in Section 2.6. The summary will be in Section 2.7. 
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2.1 Requirements for Cyber Security of Smart Grid  
Smart Grid cyber security requirements can be classified into the following features: 
requirements for cyber security; typical cyber attacks; and countermeasures [17] [18]. 
In [19] analyzes information security problems which face the status of Smart Grid and 
proposes identity-based authentication and security domain to assure the safety of the cyber 
security for Smart Grid. It also pinpoints the primary source of information security threats 
to be at six weak points of the Smart Grid system: Distribution network, Power station, 
Electric vehicles (EV), Advanced Measurement Systems, Indoor Internet users, and 
Operation networks of the electricity transmission systems. Popular security problems in 
Smart Grid standards that take on communications protocols and the main motives for these 
problems have been discussed in Refs [20] and [21]; also the cyber-security weakness and 
adversary entry points to the grid infrastructure have been highlighted. 
Based on the recent detailed guideline for Smart Grid cyber-security that was issued by the 
cyber-security working team in the NIST, the three major high-level key cyber-security 
requirements for the Smart Grid system are illustrated in Fig. 13. 
 
Figure 13: The three major cyber-security requirements for the Smart Grid 
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Examples of some typical cyber attacks which may be used by the attacker affect the Smart 
Grid system as follows: DoS or DDoS attacks, wherein the main goal is to disrupt the 
availability of the grid system through hindering message exchange between devices of the 
Smart Grid system. These types of attack decrease the availability of the system.  Malicious 
Software, generally known as malware, exists in various common forms: viruses, worms, 
Trojan horses, logic bombs, and backdoors or trapdoors. Such attacks may directly or 
indirectly compromise the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of the Smart Grid. The 
programmers are deliberately embedding logic bombs, backdoors and trapdoors into 
programs which may be utilized to launch attacks later. Identity spoofing  are attacks which 
allow adversaries to impersonate an authorized user without using the user’s password. 
Common types of this attack include man-in-the-middle, message replay, network spoofing 
(for example IP spoofing), and software exploitation attacks. Password Pilfering attacks 
are these in which data confidentiality is violated. Different techniques and methods could 
be used in such attacks, like guessing, social engineering, password sniffing, and dictionary 
attack. Unlike technical attacks, the social engineering attacks refer to a method of 
attacking or penetrating a system using social skills (for example psychological measures). 
Eavesdropping attacks are carried out against data confidentiality of the SG 
communication channel by intercepting IP packets on the LAN or sniffing wireless 
transmission signals on the home area network (HAN).  Intrusions are attacks which take 
place when an illegal user gains an access to a cyber-system and gets undesired access to 
important back-end servers. Examples of popular hacking tools to commit intrusion attacks 
are Port scan and IP scan.  Side-Channel Attacks have as their main goal the retrieval of 
the cryptographic keys. The common examples of such attacks are power analysis, timing, 
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analysis, and electromagnetic attacks. Various components of the Smart Grid system like 
pole-top equipment, substations devices, HAN devices, and smart meters are vulnerable to 
side-channel attacks which could lead to an intrusion of customer privacy, administrative 
access to the grid system, and electricity usage information, passwords [20] [21]. 
In order to avoid the above mentioned cyber-security attacks, the International Electro-
technical Council (IEC) has put forward a set of relevant mitigation techniques. Technical 
solutions include encryption, access control, anti-virus, (VPN), intrusion detection system 
(IDS), firewall, etc. From a security management point of view, solutions include, risk 
assessment of assets during-attack and post-attack recovery, key management, security 
incident, security policy exchange and vulnerability reporting, etc. Examples of real cyber-
security incidents are Stuxnet and Slammer malwares. 
In [18], the cyber security requirements and the most vulnerabilities of the Smart Grid 
communication were investigated as well as a survey of the existing solutions of the cyber 
–security in the communication infrastructure of the Grid. They also identify main cyber-
security problems in securing and running a secure communication system for the Grid like 
Internetworking. Because of a weak built-in security in different devices and applications, 
the communication systems of the Smart Grid are exposed to different types of attacks that 
vary across the network. In this regard, the Smart Grid should be equipped with a model 
for a network that minimizes the most vulnerabilities and threats from fabrication, 
interruption, obstruction, and alteration. Making the transport facilities entirely owned by 
a utility, would greatly minimize the threats from intruders, as there would be no potential 
for access from intruders over the Internet. High security steps must be applied to all the 
holes in Smart Grid network system that connected to the Internet. Also an intrusion 
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detection systems are required not only at the points of the Grid network which connected 
to the Internet, but also at the important points within the Grid network well as most 
vulnerable wireless holes. Security policy and operations: the reliability of the Smart Grid 
depends on the appropriate operations of many components and the connectivity between 
them. Several methods could be used by the attackers to disrupt a Smart Grid system 
including gaining electronic access to a component and configuring it to impersonate 
another component and/or reporting a false condition or alarm. Denial of Service (DoS) is 
one of the simplest types of attacks that an attacker might attempt to prevent authorized 
devices from communicating by consuming excessive resources on one device. The Smart 
Grid protocol designers should pay attention to such threats during protocol development 
and ensure that proper care and mitigation are applied. Security services: the network 
operators can easily identify, control and manage security risks in Smart Grid 
communications via the help of security services. It has been reported by EPRI that every 
aspect of a Smart Grid must be secure. Ensuring secure operation of a Smart Grid cannot 
be achieved only via cyber security technologies, but also through policies, on-going risk 
assessment, and training. The development of such a procedure takes time, and indeed it 
needs to take time to ensure that they are done correctly. In order to achieve organizational 
objectives, the Smart Grid needs access to cost-effective, high-performance security 
services, including expertise in mobility, security, and system integration. The typical set 
of security services in Smart Grid communications include security assessment, secure 
design and implementation, risk management, security policy, managed security, and 
incident response planning. Efficiency and scalability: in critical systems such as the Smart 
Grid, the availability of the system is of high importance, so several key issues need to be 
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addressed. Firstly, to handle all requests and in order that resources do not get 
overwhelmed, an efficient use of computation and communication resources must be 
present in the system. Secondly, failures in the system which, for example, result from bad 
messages must be handled properly by employing a good error management in the system. 
Furthermore, to avoid resource exhaustion in the face of adversarial action, the error 
management functions must be fail-safe in nature. Thirdly, the system redundancy must be 
ensured so that, if sub-systems fail or are compromised, then the entire system does not 
collapse. Fourthly, in order to detect and respond to cyber attacks, a system must support 
auxiliary security functions that may be deployed in the Smart Grid communication system. 
Differences between Enterprise Network and Smart Grid Networks Security: 
technological advancement has grown rapidly over the last decade. In the IT industry, 
various security solutions to protect enterprise networks and to safeguard or lessen their 
vulnerability from any cyber attacks were developed. Solutions like firewalls and intrusion 
detection systems are the recognized effective ways to secure the communication 
infrastructure at business world and office levels. But, other solutions and techniques like 
enterprise network-based cyber security solutions fall short in providing the same level of 
security at the automation and control levels. The following are the three main differences 
between the security of Smart Grid network and enterprise network. 
1. Different security objectives: in the enterprise networks, the main security objective 
is to protect data. These include data integrity, data confidentiality, and data 
availability. In contrast, the main security objectives of the Smart Grid are human 
safety, ensuring system reliability, and protection of equipment and power lines. 
30 
 
2. Different security architecture: the data server in any enterprise networks is placed 
at the center of the network and demands more protection than the other nodes of 
the network. For Smart Grid networks, terminal nodes require a subset of the 
controls used for the central device. 
3. Different technology base: Windows, Linux, and UNIX are the operating systems 
widely used in an enterprise network, and all the devices are interconnected via 
Ethernet with IP-based protocol. In Smart Grid networks, many different protocols 
are used. 
The standard Smart Grid architecture, with attack classes highlighted at the appropriate 
location where these is the possibility of their occurrence are illustrated in Fig. 14. 
 
Figure 14: Attacks with their possible location at smart grid architecture 
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2.2 SCADA Security Concerns 
SCADA system is the core to the observing and control of a substation in the Smart Grid 
infrastructure. It provides powerful integrated solutions when upgrading remotely installed 
electric equipment and helps the utilities to obtain higher reliability of supply and reduce 
the costs of maintenance and operating. Equipping the electricity grid with advanced 
computing devices and technologies has had far-reaching effect on the security of the grid 
system. The weak points in the electricity grid are a known concern [22]. Connecting the 
electricity system devices to backend servers and invariably the Internet, has caused the 
exposure of the Smart Grid system to a vast range of cyber attacks and threats. Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is one such system that has acquired attention. 
The main attacks that may violate critical components of Smart Grid infrastructure through 
SCADA are given in the following subsections [22]:  
2.2.1 Platform Vulnerabilities 
The existing and known security gaps in company, computing resources, and backend 
networks are exploitable for hacking devices of the Smart Grid. Due to the uninstalling of 
the operating system batches, the attacker can disrupt the Smart Grid computing system, to 
initiate an attack against SCADA devices. In like manner, the absence of intrusion 
detection systems (IDs) or front-end firewall in certain applications, will give the perfect 
platform to the attacker for hacking the system of the Smart Grid. Other possible security 
gaps include software-based attacks, wherein the attacker exploits the vulnerabilities in the 
software that runs on the devices of the SCADA system. Buffer overflow and DoS are two 
examples in which the inherent ability of the software to continuously request hardware 
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resources during the program execution is exploited beyond the system capability. 
Likewise, flooding the end-servers by initiating a big set of requests for resource allocation 
will cause a Denial of Service against legal users, and this will affect the customer 
confidence in the electricity utility.  
2.2.2 Policy Vulnerabilities 
In general, the main cause of this concern comes from the security administrators defining 
a set of weak security policies for a certain system. Such a threat exists for information 
technology systems that have connectivity to the Smart Grid SCADA devices and 
components. In case a weak password leads to the disruption of a system by an adversary, 
the person responsible for this violation is the policy administrator. It is thus important for 
any system to enforce security policies that are strong enough to ensure no exploitable 
holes due to weak policies.  
2.2.3 Network Vulnerabilities 
The Smart Grid infrastructure comprises some network-layer devices; these devices could 
pose serious threats to the grid infrastructure. Configuring one of these devices according 
to weak policies may cause a disruption of the Smart Grid through ingress/egress network 
holes in the SCADA devices which are connected to the core network of the Smart Grid 
system. A few examples that clarify how mal-configured network-layer devices can cause 
a severe threat to the Smart Grid system include packet flag tampering, resetting the data 
of outstation, fragmented message intervention, and spoofing the source/destination 
address to tamper with the IP packets of devices at network-level.  
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2.3 Smart Meter Attacks and Countermeasures 
The smart meter as a newly developed device is an important component of the Smart Grid 
system. It is the central connecting point between consumer networks and the electricity 
utility (see Fig. 15).  Furthermore, it is used to measure the amount of electricity used by a 
consumer. It is simply an electrically powered device that can monitor the energy 
consumed for the specified time interval (half an hour or one hour, for example) depending 
on how it is programmed. Bi-directional connectivity is its unique feature, which allows 
customers to receive tariff information from the utility companies and to send customers’ 
readings back to utility companies for checking and billing purposes. The device can also 
be separated in two ways according to its functions and capabilities: i) metering 
capabilities, and ii) communication capabilities. For that reason, securing the smart meter 
is of extreme importance to the overall security of the Smart Grid system as any 
compromise of a smart meter may jeopardize the security of not just the household in 
question, but the entire neighborhood network and possibly the utility provider’s core 
network. Smart meter cyber attacks that violate the main pillars of information security are 
summarized in the sections below [23]. Fig. 15 provides a description of these attacks that 
target the smart meter. 
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 Figure 15: Cyber attacks that target the Smart Meter 
 
2.3.1 Confidentiality 
Cyber attacks that violate confidentiality try to thieve sensitive information that should be 
kept secret or shared only between the trusted entities. Tampering with the memory of 
smart meters, adjusting the control program of smart meters, spoofing the ingress/payload, 
and message replay attacks are some examples of how such attacks violate confidentiality. 
Several mitigation techniques have been proposed to decrease confidentiality breaches 
through a smart meter. These include replacing the shared secret keys between smart 
meters and the data concentrator unit (DCU) in a neighborhood area network, and 
eliminating the traits of the malicious attacks through configuring/resetting the device 
settings, for example, resetting the secret key, and replacing the actual device. In the Smart 
Grid system, privacy of customer data is an important concern. Tracking and analyzing the 
pattern of electricity usage of a certain household may expose many sensitive parameters 
like consumer habits which could be used by other spam parties for malicious objectives, 
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such as checking whether the customer is at home or not [24]. Acquiring such sensitive 
information by such parties may cost the electricity utility through selling this information 
to its competitors who may use it maliciously.  
2.3.2 Integrity 
The cyber attacks that violate a smart meter's integrity happen when the legal data of the 
smart meter is manipulated, erased, or replaced before this data is transmitted to the data 
concentrator unit (DCU) within a neighborhood area network (NAN). The data can be 
tampered with by the attacker in two ways, either while it is stored (i.e. within the device’s 
computing resources or memory) or in transit through rigging/erasing/injection of 
messages. Fabricated data can be injected into the communication channel of the smart 
meter by the attacker to commit energy fraud by either increasing or decreasing the 
electricity consumption of a certain household. Such a violation will cost both the end-
consumers and/or the electricity company. Two malicious intentions may motivate the 
attacker to launch a message replay attack. First, the electricity company may receive the 
same smart meter electricity usage reading from a house as previous ones. Accordingly, an 
inflated electricity usage reading of a house may go unrecorded. Second, in a similar way, 
due to a faking attack the reported electricity readings from a household may be reduced 
to benefit the end consumer, to the cost of the electricity company. Several methods exist 
to mitigate the effect of attacks against smart meter integrity. The most popular technique 
is to enable and generate secret keys of suitable length (according to recent technological 
trends) between the two entities (sender and receiver) during electricity usage data 
transmission. Such a procedure will help ensure that the message integrity at the receiver 
side will be verified using a message authentication code (MAC). 
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2.3.3 Availability 
To some extent, the attacks against availability are different from those that violate 
confidentiality and integrity. The continuing availability of a smart meter within the Smart 
Grid system is also vulnerable to cyber attacks. A denial of service (DoS) is the best known 
attack that violates availability and it comes in different forms. However, all of these kinds 
of attack share the same aim which is to attempt to make the system resources unavailable 
to its legitimate users. The following are some other examples of such attacks: turning off 
the device, DoS against network DNS server at the organization, sniffing, and disrupting 
communication channels through jamming. We need to consider that the problem of 
disabling the ZigBee security mode in a smart meter, is that it could possibly lead to invoke 
a remote turn off request to command a smart meter to be switched off. As a result, the 
electricity reading of a certain household will not be reported unless the smart meter is 
restarted. Similar results to the previous attack can be expected due to jamming the 
communication channel. The decryption of secure messages transmitted by the smart 
meters to the end-servers among data concentrator units (DCUs) will be prevented due to 
the modification of the stored secret keys at a smart meter. Smart meter availability is 
affected for all three mentioned scenarios. 
The present mitigation techniques that prevent such attacks are empowering the ZigBee 
security mode, replacement of malicious smart meters, changing the frequency of 
communication channel during message exchanging, and updating the secret keys.  
2.3.4 Non-repudiation 
NIAG defines nonrepudiation as “assurance the sender of data is provided with proof of 
delivery and the recipient is provided with proof of the sender’s identity, so neither can 
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later deny having processed the data”. In this kind of attack the attacker attempts to deny 
any misbehavior against the system. For example, a certain malicious smart meter may 
convey a fake reading to the electricity provider, and then deny having done so. Non-
repudiation can be enforced through the use of secret keys for data encryption within the 
smart meter; no other object is expected to have a copy of the same secret key. Conversely, 
the absence of a secret-key based approach will hinder the identification of such a cyber-
attack [25]. 
A motive behind the launching of such attacks against the smart meter is to tamper with 
the configuration of the meter. Within the Smart Grid system, smart meters must be secure 
enough to resist both hardware and software-based cyber attacks that try to manipulate its 
configuration. The enormous number of smart meters [26] (i.e. smart meter households) 
that are deployed in a metropolitan city requires high security in order to avoid a large-
scale disaster due to such attacks. Several cryptography-based techniques are proposed for 
the protection of data confidentiality in the Smart Grid system [27].  
2.4 Physical Layer Attacks and Countermeasures 
Communication plays a critical role in the Smart Distribution Grid (SDG) as it enables the 
utilities to attain three key objectives: security, intelligent monitoring, and load balancing. 
However, compared to wire communications, wireless communications are usually more 
vulnerable to security attacks. Therefore, developing a suitable wireless communication 
architecture and its security measures is very important for a Smart Distribution Grid 
(SDG). 
38 
 
The authors in [28] have investigated and put forward a wireless communication 
architecture for the Smart Distribution Grid (SDG), followed by an in-depth analysis of the 
security framework for this communication architecture. To achieve a robust, reliable, and 
secure communication architecture for a Smart Distribution Grid (SDG), several design 
rules are formulated as follows: 
1. security measures must be considered at all protocol layers, and cross-layer design 
is adopted whenever possible; 
2. protecting the time critical messages through deploying a security mechanism; 
3. all the wired communication links must be subjected to high security to strengthen 
the security of the wireless communication paths. 
In addition, information messages should have different security levels based on two 
important criteria: delay and loss. The messages that are highly dependent on both delay 
and loss should have the highest security level. Messages that are only dependent on either 
delay or loss should have a medium level of security, while messages without delay or loss 
constraint should have the lowest security level. Dedicated resources must be allocated to 
messages with the highest security level. 
Authors [28] have identified threats violating the Smart Distribution Grid (SDG) through 
the wireless channel as follows: 
1. jamming; 
2. eavesdropping by outsider nodes; 
3. spying on wireless medium by malicious node; 
4. executing attacks from wireless channels of the SDG. 
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Several security measures were proposed for security of the SDG as follows: 
1. anti-jamming approaches; 
2. securing the physical layer to prevent eavesdropping; 
3. securing the network access from any unauthorized nodes through effective 
authentication schemes; 
4. implementing highly secure protocols to disable insider attack. 
In [28] and [29] an in-depth analysis of the physical layer attacks were provided as follows: 
2.4.1 Eavesdropping  
As a wireless signal propagates over open space, any unauthorized node is able to capture 
the data transmitted and access credential information. As a result, the confidentiality 
requirements maybe violated. Critical data of the smart meter can easily be noticed through 
such an attack. Low-cost adversaries exist in the market, to easily launch such attacks using 
off-the-shelf hardware components. It is not easy to detect such an attack, as the adversary 
does not expose its activity. With a view to protecting critical data from being exposed to 
the attackers, a data encryption approach should be used. In any case, if a certain pattern 
of transmitted data is depicted, a brilliant attacker may still be capable of analyze and 
decipher the message content. For example, the electricity usage of a household will reduce 
if this household is unoccupied. If the smart meter communicates with the data concentrator 
unit (DCU) only when a specific threshold of electricity usage is exceeded, or if the 
transmitted message length is directly proportional to electricity consumption, a pattern of 
activity for a certain house could subsequently be constructed. 
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2.4.2 Jamming 
The primary aim of this attack is to disrupt communication and information flow in any 
wireless network architecture by filling the wireless medium with noise signals. Within the 
Smart Grid system, an attacker may try to block the exchanging of information with the 
electricity provider through filling the wireless channel with noise signals. There are two 
types of this attack: 
i. Proactive jamming. In this attack, the wireless channel is continuously blocked by 
continuously giving out noise signals. 
ii. Reactive jamming. This kind of attack only launches when sensing signals on the 
channel. The legitimate node could suffer from this attack in two ways: 
a. The channel will always be busy for any channel sensing performed by this 
node. 
b. The node maybe fail to receive packets. Also it is not easy, to detect a 
reactive jammer as it is so difficult to know whether the packet error results 
from attacks or normal collision. 
2.4.3 Injecting Request or Restrict Access  
The primary purpose behind launching this attack is to interrupt the routine operations of 
MAC layer within the smart meter. The adversary may succeed in blocking the smart 
meters from commencing their legal MAC operations or causing packet collisions. This 
attack can be summarized as follows: 
i. It is almost identical to reactive jamming, wherein the attack is initiated with the 
main intent of blocking the communication channel. 
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ii. It attacks a multi-user access channel. 
iii. The adversary sets its own backoff timer to be of very short length, and so the 
channel prioritizes access to the attacker each time it desires to communicate, while 
legitimate smart meters of the Smart Grid system have their access denied.  
2.4.4 Injection Attack 
Dissimilar to the two prior attacks that rely heavily on spurious signals, the injection attack 
inserts structured messages into the wireless channels. Imitation and replay attacks fall into 
this category. We may describe this attack as follows: 
i. The attacker imitates either a legal sender/receiver node to acquire unauthorized 
access to the wireless network. A common imitation is device cloning. At the 
physical layer, the cloning is obtained by means of spoofing the MAC address. 
Replay attack: a malicious repetition or holdup for a valid data transmission by an 
adversary. 
ii. This attack has almost identical characteristics to the TCP-SYN flooding attack. 
That is, when receiving too many fake messages, a victim can be burdened with 
processing them. Then the overhead system resource cannot respond to legitimate 
requests any more. Due to this violation the availability requirement is affected. In 
this attack, the messages remain readable by the receiver so that it is not easy to 
prevent the attack.  
In order to avoid such an attack, suitable security mechanisms should be enabled to 
confirm message authentication. 
42 
 
2.5 Data Injection and Replay Attacks 
Another type of cyber attack in the Smart Grid system is the data injection and replay 
attack. In this, attacks take place when fabricated data is inserted into the smart meter or 
neighborhood area measurements and this noticed by a network worker. These attacks 
mainly target the Smart Grid infrastructure, especially monitoring and control sub-systems 
with the intention of tampering with smart meters and phasor measurement units (PMU). 
As a result, the operation and control of the electricity provider are misguided [30]. In [30], 
[31], and [32], an effort is made to examine methodically and intelligently Smart Grid data 
for possible data injection. The proposed method towards detecting such an attack does a 
rough calculation on the state of the system from the observed measurements and calculates 
the remaining quantity between the observed and the estimated measurements. 
Message replay attacks happen when an adversary gets a high privilege access to smart 
meters and can consequently insert control signals into the system. For launching this 
attack, the attacker may need to (a) obtain customers’ electricity usage behavior via 
capturing and analyzing data exchanged between the appliances and smart meters within 
the household, and (b) manipulate and insert fake control signals into the system. In 
general, the primary goals of the replay attack are as follow: 
1. Energy fraud, through rerouting electricity to another site. 
2. Causing physical harm to the grid system. The famous example of this is Stuxnet 
Malware. 
The authors in [33] focused mainly on one of the most well known security cyber attacks 
on the Smart Grid system, that is replay attacks. They proposed a mechanism for detecting 
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replay attacks within the Smart Grid system, wherein the house appliances are considered 
as linear time invariant systems, where the smart meter is entrusted the task of observing 
the household devices. The observed minimum variance in actual device readings is tested 
through a state estimator based on Kalman filters. The suspicious anomalous activities that 
affect the Smart Grid are discovered via a detector device on the observed readings. This 
proposed detector device is not only adaptable for serving a single household, but also 
serves a group of households in the neighborhood. The replay attack is clearly define as a 
modification to the control signal that is exchanged between consumer appliances within 
the household and the smart meter. 
A theory-based method for identifying the attacks against state estimator perturbations 
have been illustrated in a graph in [34]. A graph that composed of transmission lines and 
smart meters is used to model the entire power system. The Control System Center (CSC) 
is responsible for performing the state estimation in a centralized way. The purpose of the 
estimation is to retrieve the entire system state. The state remains unsteady based on the 
adversaries data that have been injected. The measuring of Minimum Mean Square Error 
(MMSE) used to verify this, the MMSE will invariably be higher in the existence of the 
malicious data. The likelihood that the Control Center (CC) detects the attack is increased 
by the increase of the injected energy. A simple optimization is used to confirm the 
suspicious meters as injecting malicious data into the network, According to the 
Generalized Likelihood Ratio Test (GLRT). The smallest noticeable attacks which result 
in highest harm to the state estimates are detected through the algorithm operates in 
polynomial time.  
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2.6 Network-based Attacks 
The man-in-the-middle is a notorious example of topology attacks on a Smart Grid [35]. 
This attack happen when the adversary prevents network data (e.g., breaker and switch 
states) and meter's data from distant terminal units, falsifies a part of these, and redirects 
the modified version to the control center. In the lack of data alerts in recent power systems, 
the hacker could succeed in adjusting both smart meter and network data so elaborately 
that they are consistent with the “target” topology. 
In [36], the authors present and investigate several kinds of intelligent attacks and 
countermeasures in the Smart Grid communication system, which aim for higher-level 
damage or benefits by taking advantage of the network structure as well as of its protocol 
functionality. Moreover, a fusion-based defense approach is suggested for detecting attacks 
in the Smart Grid according to the received feedback from individual nodes in the network. 
Each node in the network is required to communicate with a centralized fusion center to 
transfer its observations, through the help of the needed communication protocols. The 
paper emphasizes that deliberate attacks may be aimed to only a specific subset of nodes 
of the Smart Grid, and consequently feedback from all nodes is extremely important for 
accurately detecting these attacks. A game-based theory analysis is afterward provided in 
which the adversary is treated as one player and the protector as another. According to the 
concept that the adversary plans to violate the most critical nodes, the defense master plan 
is to ensure that timely local observation by distinct critical nodes, and following 
communication of findings to the centralized fusion center, are absolutely necessary. 
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The significant operations of the Smart Grid like error detection and event location 
estimation are depend heavily on accurate timing information. Well-known example of the 
attacks that could target timing information in the Smart Grid system is a Time 
Synchronization Attack (TSA). Due to this attack, three applications of phasor 
measurement units (PMU) are affected, namely voltage stability monitoring, transmission 
line fault detection, and event localization [37]. 
In [38], the authors introduce the effects of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on load 
frequency control (LFC) of Smart Grids. Unlike the existing works, the authors consider 
the problem of how DoS attacks affect the dynamic performance of a power system. The 
data of the Smart Grid that measured through a remote terminal is dispatched to the 
centralized control centers. The DoS attack can remarkably affect the operations of the 
Smart Grid, if the communication channel that connected these sensors to the control center 
is attacked, i.e. sensors unable to deliver messages to the destination. The attacker launches 
such an attack by jamming the channel through inserting large numbers of packets. The 
power system is depicted as a linear time invariant model. For a switched linear system, a 
DoS attack is identified if the calculated Eigenvalues for the system matrix fall outside the 
unity circle.  
2.7 Summary  
Cyber attacks that target the infrastructure of the Smart Grid system do not have an impact 
on the consumer alone, but also affect the business of the electricity utility. There are many 
threats against the Smart Grid system, which may give rise to attacks based on the profit 
they will bring to the attacker. Five distinct classes of cyber attacks were studied and 
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analyzed to facilitate the identification and analysis process. The proposed mitigation 
techniques which aim to defend against all such attacks have also been studied and listed 
in this chapter. Smart Grid security is still in its infancy, so a large-scale research work is 
still required to block the most exploitable threats and holes within the Smart Grid security 
system without affecting the consumers through deployment of strong security controls 
and constraints 
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3 CHAPTER 3 
DETECTING SMART METER COMPROMISE 
ATTACKS THROUGH NEIGHBHOOD AREA METER 
CLUSTERING 
Conventional intrusion detection systems (IDs) are not easily integrated into the Advanced 
Metering Infrastructure (AMI). An AMI is not restricted to backend IP-based networks but 
rather constitutes, in a mesh-like structure, an interconnection of multiple smart grid 
devices. For this reason, it may not suffice to have a single front-end intrusion detection 
system which will both protect an entire neighborhood network while at the same time 
identifying anomalous network traffic. Furthermore, extensive AMIs are in operation the 
world over, each deploying millions of smart meters equipped with computerized systems 
which are all potential targets of malicious actors. Compromising a smart meter may 
jeopardize not only the particular household, but also the whole neighborhood network and 
perhaps the utility provider’s core network, too. Of all the malicious attacks directed 
against the AMI, it is Energy Fraud which is of the greatest concern. Energy Fraud’s 
principle point of entry for the launch of its attacks is the compromise of the smart meter 
with a view to manipulating the readings which are relayed to its service provider. 
Installation of rogue scripts on the smart meter by means of penetration through its 
unpatched software and/or firmware is one method an adversary may use to compromise a 
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smart meter. Additionally, such vulnerabilities may be the target of remote attacks via the 
Internet or through a Wi-Fi or ZigBee connection. The adversary may also be motivated to 
disrupt service, steal sensitive information, and exploit the communication infrastructure 
for the purposes of launching resource exhaustion attacks, such as Distributed Denial of 
Service (DDoS) attacks. Malicious attacks against smart meters not only allow interference 
with energy data, but high bandwidth attacks, such as DoS can be launched against other 
smart grid devices by compromised smart meters. 
In this chapter, we propose a novel distributed information sharing mechanism to perform 
localized intrusion detection within pre-defined clusters of smart meters. Deployment of 
this scheme (Fig. 16) effectively reduces the data processing overhead which centralized 
intrusion detection systems operating at the utility provider facility have to absorb. This 
scheme operates through a system of collaborative sharing between smart meters of the 
neighborhood or cluster. Smart meters exchange information at fixed time intervals, 
assuming loose time synchronization. Exchanging local electricity usage readings between 
peer meters gives leverage to localized intelligence on observed network traffic by the 
smart meters relayed to the concentrator unit, thereby also facilitating the holistic 
visualization of network traffic activity. The goals of this chapter can be summarized as 
follows: 
1. Proposed mechanism for the formation of clusters of smart meters within a 
neighborhood area network, 
2. Design of a scheme to support timely exchange of smart meter readings between 
smart meters within a cluster. 
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 Figure 16: Assumed topology for the clustered advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) 
 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: section 3.1 provides a background including 
a literature survey of existing security frameworks and techniques for the AMI; a review 
of advanced metering infrastructure, AMI, and its unique characteristics and capabilities; 
an attack tree for Energy Fraud; and the scheme notations. In section 3.2, the attacker 
model for AMI is provided. The attack detection scheme for meter compromise attacks is 
elaborated upon in section 3.3. 
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3.1 Background 
3.1.1 Related Work 
The required technical proficiencies for securing an illegitimate access to the smart meter 
device are easily achievable and cause an imminent threat to the security of the entire Smart 
Grid system. S. McLaughlin et al. 2010, concentrated on the energy fraud attacks. They 
constructed an archetypal attack tree to show the methods and motives of adversaries 
against the Advanced Metering Infrastructure AMI. The authors identified the main 
techniques of carrying out an energy fraud attack through a smart meter. This includes 
deleting the meter's storage, intercepting the communication channel between the meter 
and backend server, injecting fake data into the network, tampering with the meter's 
calculation, and physically hacking the meter's memory [39]. 
Y. Tanaka et al. 2012, proposed a security mechanism for the communication between 
HAN devices and the smart meter. The data integrity is ensured by the use of public key 
certiﬁcates, thus the origin authentication among all the communicating entities for a secure 
registration process was also ensured [40]. J. Kamto 2012, proposed a public key-based 
technique for a secure data transmission between the smart meters and the relay gateway 
within the smart grid infrastructure. Because of this, intermediate nodes that may work for 
forwarding the data in multi-hop topologies are incapable of deciphering the critical 
electricity reading that is transiting through them [41]. 
M. Nabeel et al. 2012, proposed a security mechanism using Physically Unclonable 
Functions (PUF), to secure the communication channels within the AMI. The utility 
provider authenticates a smart meter device via a hardware component which is embedded 
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in the smart meter. This mechanism hinders key leakages from weak smart meter 
architectures. Even so, the disruption of the entire smart meter continues unresolved [42]. 
N. Saputro et al. 2012, proposed an approach for securing data authentication and privacy 
preservation via cryptographic keys. Such an approach will protect the traffic of a smart 
meter from any malicious attacks [43] [44]. Several guidelines were provided by D. 
Grochocki et al. 2012, to ensure the security of AMI. This includes a mechanism to observe 
all in and out network traffic and detect malicious attacks via a centralized Intrusion 
Detection System (IDs), and an approach to monitor transiting traffic by embedding sensor 
hardware in the smart meter, taking into account that a smart meter acts as a relay for 
network traffic. Furthermore, the authors also propose a hybrid of both a centralized 
detection sensor and distributed sensors within the meters for detecting malicious trafﬁc 
within an AMI [45]. Y. Zhang et al. 2011, proposed a distributed intrusion detection system 
for the smart grid, called SGDIDS. This system made up of an analyzing module (AM) 
located at each of the three layers of the Smart Grid communication infrastructure: Home 
Area Network (HAN), Neighborhood Area Network (NAN), and the Wide Area Network 
(WAN). The algorithms used in this intelligent technique for detection and classiﬁcation 
of malicious data, are Artiﬁcial Immune System (AIS)-based and Support vector machines 
(SVM) [46]. H. Li et al. 2010, proposed a scheme for verifying message based on 
compressed meter readings [47]. 
R. Berthier et al. 2010, suggested an approach to deal with intrusion threats aimed at the 
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), by use of a speciﬁcation-based intrusion detection 
system to yield higher accuracies. Such systems were found to introduce signiﬁcant 
overheads and are costly to implement [48]. R. Berthier et al. 2011, proposed a 
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speciﬁcation-based intrusion detection system that carry out real time screening of the 
traffic between meters and access points. A set of rules for monitoring application behavior 
were defined by the authors to ensure smooth system operations in the presence of 
malicious meters and the threat of DoS (Denial of Service) attacks [49].  Z. Baig, proposed 
a lightweight pattern matching scheme for detection of attacks in the Smart Grid. The 
algorithm that used in technique is the graph neuron (GN) to identify malicious or 
misbehaving devices in the network and to take appropriate measures, which may include 
replacement of the malicious device [50]. 
3.1.2 AMI Review 
Within the Smart Grid (SG), Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) plays a vital role as 
it is modernizes the way electricity works by replacing the old mechanical meters with 
smart meters which enable two-way communication between the customers and service 
providers. Aside from reading the meter data remotely, with the AMI customers can also 
perform some customized control like programming the electric appliances to maximize 
their efficiency and implement a fine demand response [51]. In addition, the real-time data 
collected from the smart meters help the utility companies to provide a faster diagnosis of 
outage and improve the reliability of the entire grid by avoiding line congestion and 
generation overloads [52]. 
The advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) is composed of smart meters, 
communications networks and data management systems. Fig. 17 shows the simple 
building blocks of AMI. The households are equipped with smart meters for collecting data 
in a time-based way. This collected data is sent back to the utility through a number of 
commonly different communications networks available like Broadband over Power Line 
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(BPL), Power Line Communications (PLC), Fixed Radio Frequency (RF) networks, and 
public networks (e.g., landline, cellular, paging). For the utility to get the information in a 
useful form, the transmitted data received by AMI’s host system should be analyzed, 
stored, and managed [53]. 
 
Figure 17: Simple building blocks of AMI 
 
AMI has introduced a huge increase in threats to the power metering. The unique 
characteristics of AMI, such as complex network structure, resource-constrained smart 
meter, and privacy sensitive data extend the attack surface and introduce many 
vulnerabilities for new cyber-attacks. Energy fraud is one of the big concerns related to the 
AIM. A World Bank report finds that up to 50% of electricity in developing countries is 
acquired via theft [54]. It also has been reported that over 6 billion dollars each year are 
lost because of   Energy fraud in the United States alone [55]. In 2009, the FBI reported a 
wide and organized Energy fraud attempt that may have cost a utility up to 400 million 
dollars annually following an AMI deployment [56]. In Canada, BC Hydro reports $100 
million in losses every year [57]. Utility companies in India and Brazil incur losses around 
$4.5 billion and $5 billion respectively due to electricity theft [58, 59]. There is even a 
video which shows how to crack the meter and cut the electricity bill in half on YouTube 
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[60]. As a result, the energy theft issue has become one of the most important concerns 
which impedes the growth of AMI. 
Smart meter is defined as a digital electric device comprise CPUs, communication 
interfaces, and storage unit. It is a key component of the smart grid infrastructure SGI, 
connecting households to the utility providers. The four basic functions performed by a 
smart meter that involving to power controlling are: a) the recording and tracking of 
demand, b) the events of power logging, e.g., outages, c) the conveyance of electricity 
usage and information of logging events to the utilities, and d) the exchange of control 
messages, e.g., remote disconnect, managing smart appliances, etc. [61].  
3.1.3 Energy Fraud Attack Tree 
As mentioned, Energy Fraud is one of the most important concerns related to the AMI. In 
order to understand strategies for Energy Fraud in AMI, we use the modeling-based 
technique of security attack trees [62]. In this attack tree, “Energy Fraud” is set as the 
adversary’s ultimate goal which is then recursively broken down into sub-goals until a 
number of likely attacks plans are arrived at and no more attacks can be divided into sub-
attacks [61]. The root node of the attack tree represents the single goal of all the attacks. In 
our case, this goal is Energy Fraud. All the nodes below the root node represent a group of 
sub-goals that describes different procedures towards the root goal. The exact attacks that 
must happen for the goal to be achieved are represented by the leaf nodes, which have no 
successor. The logical operators AND and OR are used to augment paths to the root goal 
and decide whether one or all of the children in a given internal node need to be completed 
to achieve the goal [61]. 
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Fig. 18 presents the attack tree for Energy Fraud in AMI. As shown, the single requirement 
for Energy Fraud is the tampering of the electricity readings and this can be done in three 
ways: a) while it is registered, b) while it is at rest in the smart meter, and c) as it is passing 
through the network. The following is a detailed discussion of each of these ways. 
 Disturb measurement: this is the first class of attacks, wherein an attacker attempts 
to prevent the smart meter from accurately recording the electricity consumed. This 
attack is the only one that already existed for the traditional meters, whereas the 
other two categories are limited to AMI. To launch this attack, there are two ways: 
“disconnect meter” and “meter inversion”. It is needful to wipe off the logged 
events, which point out reverse energy flow or outage, in order not to be retrieved 
by the utility company. 
 Tamper stored demand: this kind of attack violates the data stored in the smart 
meter to achieve Energy Fraud. As mentioned, the smart meters a store large range 
of data. This includes tariffs for Time-of-Use (TOU) pricing, logs for both physical 
events and executed commands, and recorded network commands. As all of the 
smart meter’s behavior is controlled by the contents of its storage, tampering with 
this stored content gives an adversary complete control over its operations. 
Tampering with the stored demand by erasing relevant records, like audit logs and 
recorded total demand requires an administrative interface access through 
extracting the meter password and reset net usage. 
 Modify in network: this class of attack involves injecting erroneous values into 
communication between smart meters and utility companies. Launching such an 
attack needs two discrete types of actions: intercept the communication and inject 
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or modify the traffic between meter and utility. After successfully intercepting the 
link between smart meter and the utility, an adversary needs to launch “man-in-the-
middle” or “meter spoofing” attacks in order to send false data and event logs [63]. 
 
 
Figure 18: Attack tree for Energy Fraud 
 
As shown in Fig. 18, we note that this attack tree is only an example to record the possible 
attacks that may be launched by an adversary to violate the AMI. This tree could be 
extended to accommodate more attack sub-trees by considering more attack strategies and 
techniques of attackers in practice.  Recent research on the AMI security and privacy 
preservation [64-67] would also benefit the construction of the attack tree. 
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3.1.4 Notations 
The notations used in this chapter are listed in Table 5 
Table 5: Notations of the scheme 
𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 Message Authentication Code 
𝐾𝐾𝐵𝐵
𝐴𝐴 A secret key shared between two entities A and B 
𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 Electricity usage data for node p 
∆𝑖𝑖 The time epoch with label i 
𝐴𝐴 Sender (Smart Meter) 
𝐵𝐵 Receiver (Data Concentrator Unit) 
𝑤𝑤 The minimum total time required for exchange of all smart meter readings 
within a cluster 
𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵 The upper threshold of energy usage  
𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 The lower threshold of energy usage 
𝑁𝑁 The total number of smart meters in AMI 
𝑚𝑚 The total number of clusters 
 
3.2 The Attack Model 
Among all the possible attacks launched by an adversary to violate AMI, one attack 
category that may pose a serious threat to the AMI is a meter compromise attack, wherein 
a smart meter is controlled by the attacker, with the intent of committing Energy Fraud. In 
general, there are different kinds of attackers with various motivations who are attempting 
to violate the AMI. The detailed analysis of the attackers provide a better understanding of 
their attack techniques. Specifically, there are three types of attackers who are motivated 
to commit Energy Fraud [68].  
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• Customer: It is the energy consumers who are the most likely to defraud the energy 
supplier. The means of interference and the motivation to tamper with conventional 
meters are highly individual in nature. It is, for example, the case in developing 
countries that people defraud energy companies because of low quality infrastructure, 
poverty, and irregularities in the metering systems.  
• Organized crime: In this case, the perpetrator is motivated by the monetization of 
energy fraud. Because AMI is so complex, customers are likely to assign to 
professional hackers the task of creating malicious software/hardware that 
compromises smart meters. This kind of hacker will exploit certain design aspects of 
AMI systems, such as the according of the same password to multiple meters, and 
thereby capitalize on the cracking of a single smart meter. 
• Utility company insiders: Generally, utility company insiders are implicitly trusted 
when dealing with analog meters and the same goes for AMI. However, in order to 
avoid deliberate misoperation or attacks by malicious utility company employees, it is 
advisable that the utility company put in place robust customer and group management 
systems which ensure internal control mechanisms, such as separation of duties. 
In this work, we use the smart meter compromise attack in which the adversary’s aim is to 
get compromised smart meters to feed incorrect readings to the data concentrator unit 
(DCU). Where the communication topology is centralized (see Fig. 19) and all smart 
meters communicate with the DCU at exact time intervals, compromised smart meters are 
bound to report incorrect readings. Energy fraud may be perpetrated through the 
communication to the DCU of a reduced usage reading, thus bringing financial benefit to 
the household where the compromised meter is located. Should the perpetrator’s goal be 
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the infliction of financial loss on the utility provider’s customer base, he may also configure 
a compromised meter to communicate inflated usage data. The outcome of such an attack 
is the undermining of consumer confidence which inevitably leads to an erosion of the 
client base at the DCU. 
 
Figure 19: The attack model where the communication topology is centralized 
  
In the proposed scheme, peer smart meters within predefined clusters of operation within 
the AMI exchange their respective readings during a set operating period. There is a regular 
exchange of local data between peer smart meters for the purpose of verifying that their 
individual readings are compatible with the usual patterns of readings one would find 
during normal smart meter operations.  
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In such a topology, compromised smart meters can be expected to behave in one of two 
ways: a) a compromised smart meter (see Fig. 20) may report correct reading (i.e. readings 
within the upper bound UB and the lower bound LB intervals) to meters sharing the same 
cluster and report incorrect readings to the DCU, thereby escaping detection, and b) the 
compromised meter may relay the same false readings to both its peer meters and the DCU 
(see Fig. 21).  
 
Figure 20: A compromised smart meter sending correct readings to peer meters and incorrect readings to DCU 
 
 
Figure 21: A compromised smart meter relay the same false readings to both its peer meters and the DCU 
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If p is the probability that a peer smart meter engaged in attack detection receives a true 
message from a compromised smart meter alluding to the attack and x is the ratio of 
compromised smart meters not telling the truth (i.e. meters which deceive their peer meters 
by relaying to them true readings while conveying false ones to the DCU), then the 
probability of an attack remaining undetected by the DCU is given by: 
                                                𝑃𝑃 = (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑥𝑥                                                                       (1) 
Where, 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑁𝑁
𝑐𝑐
− 1. 
The value of p approaches unity for the first attack scenario, in which compromised smart 
meters relay true readings to both peer meters and the DCU. 
A sophisticated and cunning adversary may send two separate and different readings to the 
DCU and to the peer smart meters. A normal reading forwarded to the peer smart meter 
will allow the compromised smart meter to operate covertly without raising any alarms 
within its cluster of operation. Meanwhile the compromised smart meter will relay the 
fabricated electricity usage reading to the DCU. The adversary succeeds hereby in 
achieving his goal of perpetrating energy fraud or undermining consumer confidence in the 
utility provider. In such a scenario, the probability of an attack remaining undetected by 
the DCU is given by:  
                                             𝑄𝑄 = 𝑞𝑞. (1 − 𝑝𝑝)𝑥𝑥                                                                   (2) 
Where, q is the probability that a true message is relayed by a compromised smart meter to 
the DCU. The higher the number of compromised meters sending two different messages 
to both the DCU and the peer meters, the lower the probability of the attack being detected. 
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3.3 Attack Detection Scheme 
The attack detection scheme proposed in this chapter is a distributed information sharing 
system whose aim is to detect intrusion within predefined clusters of smart meters in AMI: 
the scheme works to detect attacks by an adversary on smart meters within a cluster 
specified in neighborhood area networks. It is proposed that individual clusters of smart 
meters be specified at the initialization of the network (Fig. 16) based on their physical 
coordinates within a neighborhood area network. These coordinates generally remain 
unchanged throughout, save where a specific device fails or a security breach occurs. For 
the purpose of ascertaining that the minimum number of peer readings necessary for attack 
detection is operational at any point in time, the logical clustering of smart meters within a 
neighborhood area network becomes a key component of the scheme we propose. The 
principle reason for using clusters of meters for attack detection is twofold: the compromise 
of a smart meter is detected within the cluster, thereby preempting or reducing the overhead 
associated with information sharing at the wide area network level; the effects on the attack 
detection accuracy will be limited within the cluster, should a meter fail or be 
compromised.  
3.3.1 Assumption 
The AMI can have a few hundred to several thousand smart meters in operation in a 
neighborhood area network at any given point in time. All smart meters are equipped with 
wireless communication capability based on the ZigBee standard. Typically a smart meter 
is capable of wireless transmission to and reception from the DCU over distances of about 
1,000 meters, with the bit error rate increasing as the distances grow. The application of a 
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secure key management protocol [69] is crucial to protect the conﬁdentiality of all 
messages exchanged between the smart meters at the peer level, or between the smart 
meters and the centralized DCU. The assumption is made that all smart meters of a 
particular cluster are loosely time-synchronized, so as to guarantee the freshness of 
messages exchanged to prevent message replay attacks. Furthermore, given that the 
proposed attack detection scheme relies on timely communication between the smart 
meters, synchronization is of vital importance. 
As part of the detection scheme, communication takes place either between a smart meter 
and the data concentrator unit, or between two smart meters. The message formats are 
given by: 
                                       A 
            
�⎯⎯� B: mac {𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 ,𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵, ∆𝑖𝑖}                                                            (3) 
where, 
mac: Message Authentication Code 
𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐴
𝐵𝐵: Secret key shared between two entities A and B 
𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝 : Electricity usage data for node p 
∆𝑖𝑖: Time epoch with label i 
A: Sender (Smart meter) 
B: Receiver (Data Concentrator Unit) 
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3.3.2 The Scheme 
The attack detection scheme, as illustrated in Algorithm 1, consists of the following four 
phases of operation. 
Algorithm 1 Meter Compromise Attack Detection Scheme  
1. Initialization 
Deﬁne empirical upper and lower bounds (UT and LT) based on an initial run of the AMI 
for gathering normal electricity usage data. 
2. Peer Usage Data Exchange 
For each node 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑: 
Report household electricity usage reading to peer meters of the cluster. 
3. Attack Detection at each node of the network 
At each node 𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁 during a time epoch ∆𝑖𝑖:  
for k=1 to 𝑁𝑁
𝑐𝑐
− 1 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑  
        if 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 (𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘) < 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) ||          𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒 (𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑘𝑘) >  𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢(𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵) then 
              Identify 𝑘𝑘 as compromised 
              Report the message (𝑚𝑚 = "𝑘𝑘 𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑") 𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑈𝑈:𝑚𝑚,𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚�∆𝑖𝑖,𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷,𝑚𝑚� 
        end        
end 
4. Meter-to-DCU Communication 
At the DCU: 
if ∃ 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 𝑢𝑢. 𝑒𝑒.𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑑𝑑𝑜𝑜 𝑚𝑚𝑑𝑑𝑚𝑚𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑 𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 > 𝑁𝑁2∗𝑐𝑐 − 1 then 
       Confirm 𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚 as compromised 
end 
 
Initialization: At the network initialization time, which is executed once, smart meters are 
pre conﬁgured with node IDs of other smart meters that constitute the same cluster. The 
communication between the smart meters and the data concentrator unit is done at ﬁxed 
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intervals of time. The time window length is given by w < ∆, where w is deﬁned as the 
minimum total time required for the exchange of all smart meter readings within a cluster 
for attack detection. This quantity is derived through the averaging of results obtained from 
several simulation runs for a network with given size and given geographical dispersal of 
smart meters in a neighborhood area network. The length of the time window is a function 
of the total number of smart meters that constitute a cluster, as well as the communication 
standard used (ZigBee in our case). In addition, upper and lower thresholds of energy usage 
given by UB and LB have constant values which are stored within each smart meter of a 
given neighborhood. 
Usage Data Exchange: Household electricity usage readings are transmitted by each smart 
meter to every other peer smart meter within its respective cluster of operation. The 
communication takes place in each time epoch ∆𝑖𝑖. 
Attack Identification: For an AMI with N smart meters, and c clusters, the estimated 
number of messages that a smart meter will receive within a given ∆𝑖𝑖 is equal to 
𝑁𝑁
𝑐𝑐
− 1. For 
a given time epoch, if a smart meter receives less than 𝑁𝑁
𝑐𝑐
− 1 messages, a smart meter 
compromise is suspected, and accordingly reported to the data concentrator unit. On the 
other hand, if all peer smart meter readings are received by a smart meter j, then j proceeds 
with its analysis of the smart meter readings. This analysis comprises the comparison of 
electricity usage data received from other peer smart meters, with predeﬁned thresholds 
UB and LB. An anomaly is suspected when: 
𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢(𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒(ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘) 𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒(ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑘𝑘) > 𝑒𝑒ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑢𝑢(𝑈𝑈𝐵𝐵), where, 
thres(LB) and thres(UB) are empirical estimates on the minimum and maximum energy 
66 
 
consumption readings of households within a given neighborhood cluster, deﬁned during 
network initialization, and k is a peer smart meter of meter j. 
Meter-to-DCU Communication: Smart meters are conﬁgured to communicate with the data 
concentrator unit regularly to communicate household usage readings. An anomaly is 
detected by the data concentrator unit if the usage data reported by a smart meter for a 
suspicious meter k is beyond the upper and lower thresholds of consumption. The 
communication between the smart meters and DCU is resistant to message replay attacks 
since a message authentication code is included with each transmitted message. 
The overhead associated with maintaining multiple clusters of smart meters within an AMI 
can be quantiﬁed as follows: a large number of clusters in the AMI will reduce the overhead 
associated with intra-cluster meter-to-meter communication as fewer meters will constitute 
each cluster. However, in such a scenario, the analysis of meter compromise attacks is done 
granularly within each cluster, with less communication overhead associated with meter-
to-meter message transmission during each epoch of time ∆𝑖𝑖. 
On the contrary, a smaller number of clusters will reduce the associated overhead with 
generating and maintaining cluster information at the DCU during Initialization. DCU will 
analyze data coming from a larger number of meters of a cluster, thus increasing the 
likelihood of identifying the attack. The overhead associated with data communication 
between individual smart meters of a cluster for such large cluster sizes will be higher. The 
total overhead as a function of the cluster sizes can be described as follows: 
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                                    𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = 𝑚𝑚. ��𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐� .𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 + 𝑝𝑝. �𝑁𝑁𝑐𝑐 − 1� .𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑�                                    (4) 
Where,  
N is the total number of smart meters in an AMI  
c is the total number of clusters 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is the average overhead associated with data communication between the 
smart meters of a cluster 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑑𝑑𝑐𝑐𝑑𝑑 is the average overhead associated with data communication between the 
smart meters and the DCU 
𝑝𝑝 is the likelihood that a smart meter correctly identiﬁes an anomalous peer 
reading 
 
If for 𝑁𝑁
𝐷𝐷
− 1 readings received by a smart meter during a given ∆𝑖𝑖, the likelihood of a meter 
compromise is 𝑝𝑝 > 0, then the overhead associated with transmitting this particular 
anomalous ﬁnding to the DCU is as deﬁned above. On the contrary, if none of the smart 
meters within a cluster are compromised, the overhead associated with data communication 
with the DCU reduces to zero. 
As can be seen from Algorithm 1, individual smart meters of a cluster exchange their 
respective electricity usage readings with peer meters during each of time epoch ∆𝑖𝑖. A node 
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k is considered to be compromised by a smart meter, if its observed readings are beyond 
the stipulated bounds of usage (i.e. less than thres(LB) or greater than thres(UB)). Any 
anomalous reading is considered suspicious by the smart meters within the clusters, and is 
conveyed to the DCU. During each epoch of time ∆𝑖𝑖, if the total number of anomalous 
conﬁrmations against a node k received by the DCU is greater than 𝑁𝑁
2∗𝑐𝑐
− 1, then node k is 
confirmed as compromised. 
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4 CHAPTER 4 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we provide a detailed performance analysis of the simulation that was 
performed for varying simulator parameter values. The proposed scheme was tested 
through a discrete event simulation, written in JAVA code, of varying neighborhood area 
networks of an AMI. The results were averaged over 100 runs, and these helped quantify 
the detection rate, false alarms and the communication overhead for varying numbers of 
nodes in the network, for varying cluster sizes, and for four different levels network 
compromised by adversary and four different packet loss/drop rates. Data communication 
between the smart meters was assumed to follow the Poisson distribution. 
The values of upper and lower thresholds do not have an effect on the accuracy of attack 
detection. Based on the empirical household electricity usage readings of a neighborhood, 
these values will vary. 
For the accurate detection of malicious smart meters, all such smart meters must 
communicate false readings to their respective peer meters of a cluster, while relaying 
accurate readings to the data concentrator unit (DCU). However, this may not always be 
the case. We have therefore simulated four different levels of attacks representing four 
varying attacker behaviors, as follows: 
L1: 25% of compromised meters (r) convey false readings to the DCU, whereas the 
remainder 75% convey correct readings. L2: 50% of the compromised meters convey false 
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readings to the DCU, with the remainder 50% conveying correct meter readings. L3: 75% 
of compromised meters convey false readings to the DCU, with the remainder 25% 
conveying correct meter readings. L4: 90% of compromised meters convey false readings 
to the DCU, with the remainder 10% conveying correct meter readings. 
In order to test the effect of varying cluster sizes on the attack detection and false alarm 
rates we performed simulations for 𝑚𝑚. The size of the clusters was varied from 2% to 100% 
of the total number of meters in the neighborhood (N), for each cluster size the attack 
detection rate is plotted against the number of compromised smart meters 𝑥𝑥 (see Fig. 22). 
 
Figure 22: Attack Detection Rate for Varying Cluster Size 
 
The attack detection rate was found to degrade with increasing numbers of compromised 
meters (Fig. 22). A corresponding increase in the number of compromised meters 
remaining undetected (i.e., false negative rate) is observable through (Fig. 23). The 
detection rate is close to the 100% mark for zero compromised meters, thus show casing 
the effect of the detection scheme in distinctly identifying meter compromise attacks. 
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 Figure 23: False Negative Rate for Varying Cluster Size 
 
Larger numbers of clusters yield higher detection rates even in the existence of a relatively 
great number of compromised smart meters (𝑚𝑚 = 𝑁𝑁 𝑚𝑚𝑛𝑛𝑑𝑑 𝑒𝑒 ≈ 100%). For instance, with 
c=N clusters operational in the network, the attack detection rate is close to 80% even 
for 𝑥𝑥 > 90%. On the other hand, with fewer numbers of clusters in the network, a larger 
number of smart meters are to be monitored by each smart meter of the cluster, and 
therefore, the attack detection rate is degraded. Increasing numbers of compromised smart 
meters in the network will degrade attack detection rate, for all values of c. 
The total delay associated with communication between the smart meters is illustrated in 
(Fig. 24). Increasing number of smart meters in a cluster will lead to increasing delays. For 
a cluster of size N=1000, a delay of approximately 25ms is observed, whereas, for smaller 
cluster sizes, and with parallel execution of the attack detection process in all clusters, the 
delay is far less (lowest value reported being 0.2ms for a c=0.02N). 
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Figure 24: Communication Overhead Imposed by the Detection Scheme 
 
In (Fig. 25), we have simulated the effect of four different levels network compromised by 
adversary on the detection rate for the best cluster size (i.e. 𝑚𝑚 = 𝑁𝑁), and for varying 
numbers of compromised meters. As can be observed from the ﬁgure, for fewer 
compromised meters, the effect of varying adversary classes on the attack detection rate is 
not signiﬁcant. A detection rate close to 100% is observed for all such cases. On the other 
hand, with increasing numbers of compromised meters, the detection rate degrades, with a 
mere 50% of attacks detected with 95% compromised meters. The variation between the 
different attacker classes is not signiﬁcant in this case because despite having correct 
readings conveyed to the DCU, the existence of an enormous number of peer meters in a 
large network will ensure that the reis a high likelihood of more than 50% of the meters in 
a cluster reporting a misbehaving meter to the DCU. 
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Figure 25: Attack Detection Rate for Varying Numbers of Compromised Nodes with 4 Different Adversary 
Classes (N=1000) 
 
The false negative rates are also not overly affected with varying attacker behavior. (Fig. 
26) illustrates how increasing numbers of attacker meters leads to increasing number of 
false negatives for the scheme. However, varying attacker behavior, as represented by the 
four adversary classes (L1-L4), do not affect the false negative rates signiﬁcantly 
74 
 
 Figure 26: False Negative Rate for Varying Numbers of Compromised Nodes with 4 Different Adversary Classes 
(N=1000) 
 
From (Fig.27), we may observe that the detection rate is higher for larger networks, with 
N=1000 yielding a detection rate close to 100% with only 5% compromised meters. 
Reducing network size has an effect on the detection rates for smaller numbers of 
compromised meters. With 50% meters being compromised smaller networks have a 
degraded detection rate as opposed to larger networks; N=100 yielding a 67% detection 
rate as compared to a detection rate of 71% for N=1000. For larger networks, more smart 
meters report misbehaving meter activity to the DCU, and therefore, the detection rate 
improves. 
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 Figure 27: Attack Detection Rate for Varying Numbers of Nodes in a Cluster and Varying Attacker Ratios 
 
The false negative rates for varying N and ﬁxed c=N, is presented in (Fig. 28). For fewer 
compromised meters, the false negatives are comparable for all values of N. With 50% 
compromised meters in the network, larger networks yield lesser false negatives as opposed 
to smaller networks, at par with our analysis of the attack detection rate (Fig. 27). In 
addition, with a large number of compromised meters (95%), the false negatives are very 
high (nearly 51%) for all network sizes. 
 
Figure 28: False Negative Rate for Varying Numbers of Nodes in a Cluster and Varying Attacker Ratios 
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Also in our scheme for the sake of accurate detection of compromised smart meters, each 
meter must receive �𝑁𝑁
𝑐𝑐
− 1� message from its respective peer-meters of a cluster. However, 
this may not be the case all the time. For a given time epoch, a meter's reading may not 
reach to the intended peer-meter in a cluster, (i.e. a smart meter receives less than (�𝑁𝑁
𝑐𝑐
− 1�  
messages). Possibly this will happen due to a sudden high packet loss/drop rate or due to a 
malicious activity of the adversary in an attempt to making a large number of meters appear 
as malicious in a given cluster, then raising false alarms and disrupting the daily operations 
of an AMI. Because of this, we have therefore simulated four different packet drop rates 
as follow: 
 
The 25% packet drop rate: 25% of compromised meters (r) are fail to convey their readings 
to intended peer-meter in a cluster. The 50% packet drop rate: 50% of compromised meters 
(r) are fail to convey their readings to intended peer-meter in a cluster. The 75% packet 
drop rate: 75% of compromised meters (r) are fail to convey their readings to intended 
peer-meter in a cluster. The 90% packet drop rate: 90% of compromised meters (r) are fail 
to convey their readings to intended peer-meter in a cluster.  
Fig. 29 shows the attack detection rate for four different packet drop rates and (N=100) 
cluster size. 
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 Figure 29: Attack Detection Rate for four Packet drop rates and N=100 
 
The attack detection rate was found to degrade with increasing numbers of compromised 
meters (r). For 25% of packet drop rate, there was a gradual fall in the detection rate with 
increasing numbers of malicious meters (r). A sharp decrease was noticed in detection rate 
for high packet drop rate (90%). For zero malicious meters the detection rate is close to 
100%, thus show capability of the scheme for detect the malicious meters. A corresponding 
grow in the false alarm rate (i.e. normal meters detected as compromised) is obvious 
through Fig. 30 The false alarm rate is rose sharply for 90% packet drop rate. A gradual 
climb in the false alarm rate is observed for 25% packet drop rate. Increasing numbers of 
compromised smart meters in the network will rise false alarm, for all four values of packet 
drop rates. 
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Figure 30: The False Rate for four Packet drop rates and N=100 
 
In order to examine the effect of packet loss/drop rate and different cluster sizes (i.e. N= 
100, N=300, N=500, and N=1000) on the detection and false alarm rates, we repeated the 
simulation of scenario (1) with varying the value of N. Fig. 31 shows clearly the effect of 
four different packet drop rates on the attack detection rate with fixed number of 
compromised meters (𝑒𝑒 = 45).  
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 Figure 31: Attack Detection Rate for four Packet drop rates and different Cluster Sizes and fixed number of 
compromised meter (r) =45 
 
The detection rate is increased markedly with increasing numbers of meters in the cluster. 
Larger numbers of meters in a cluster yield higher detection rates as large number of meters 
will collaborate to detect the malicious meters. The lowest value of detection rate were 
recorded is 49% for cluster size of (N=100 and Packet drop rate 90%) with (r=45) 
compromised meter.  
In contrast to the detection rate, the false alarm rate was found to degrade with increasing 
cluster size (see Fig. 32). Between N=300 and N=500 there was a sharp fall in false alarm 
rate for a packet drop rate 50%. The false alarm rate was at its lowest value (0.03%) for a 
packet drop rate 25% and N=1000. 
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 Figure 32: Attack Detection Rate for four Packet drop rates and different Cluster Sizes and fixed number of 
compromised meter (r) =45 
 
In addition, we fixed the packet drop rate (=25%) and varying cluster size (i.e. N=100, 
N=300, N=500, and N=1000) with four different values of compromised meters r (i.e. 
r=35, r=45, r=55, and r=65). 
Fig. 33 shows that for all values of r, it observed that the detection rate is gradually 
increased with increasing the cluster size. Larger networks; N=1000 yielding a high 
detection rate as compared to the detection rate when N=100. For larger networks, more 
smart meters report misbehaving meter activity to the DCU, and therefore, the detection 
rate improves. 
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 Figure 33: Attack Detection Rate for fixed Packet drop rate (=25%) and Varying Cluster Sizes with different 
Attacker ratio 
 
The false alarm rates for varying cluster sizes and attacker ratio with packet drop rate 
(=25%) is illustrated in Fig. 34. For all values of N, the false alarm rate is gradually dropped 
with increasing the number of compromised meters (r = 35 – r=65). Larger networks yield 
lesser false alarm rates. In addition, large number of compromised meters (r=65), the false 
alarm rates are the highest for all network sizes. 
 
Figure 34: False Alarm Rate for fixed Packet drop rate (=25%) and Varying Cluster Sizes with different 
Attacker ratio 
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From the analysis of the simulations, we may observe that our scheme performs 
consistently even in the presence of varying numbers of compromised meters and diverse 
adversary types. The effect of peer monitoring on smart meter anomaly detection is 
therefore a promising approach towards identifying misbehaving smart meters and 
reporting these to the DCU. 
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5 CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Conclusion  
Cyber attacks that target the infrastructure of smart grid systems not only have an impact 
on the consumer but are also detrimental to the business of the electricity utility. There are 
many threats against the smart grid system which may develop into attacks based on the 
profit the attacker will reap.  Five distinct classes of cyber attacks were studied and 
analyzed to facilitate the identification and analysis process. The proposed mitigation 
techniques which aim to defend against all such attacks have also been studied and 
reported. 
With the growth of the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), many complicated cases 
of Energy Fraud have emerged and many new technologies and techniques have been 
developed to try to solve this issue. In this work, we have proposed a detection scheme to 
identify compromised smart meters in the AMI of a smart grid. The scheme groups smart 
meters of a neighborhood area network into ﬁxed size clusters, regularly multicasting their 
respective smart meter readings securely using light weighted cryptographic protocols to 
peer meters of the cluster. The purpose of information exchange is to verify electricity 
usage readings of a given neighborhood area network in a peer-to-peer fashion. 
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5.2 Future Work 
As part of our future work, we intend to study the effect of sophisticated adversaries on the 
performance of our proposed attack detection scheme. In particular, we shall model an 
adversary who modiﬁes individual smart meter readings of a neighborhood area network 
based on a random behavior pattern. For such a scenario, the attack detection process is 
anticipated to present a greater challenge.  
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